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Strategic Supply Function Competition 





A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of 
the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous 
noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium 
is privately revealing and the incentives to acquire information are preserved. Price-cost 
margins and bid shading are affected by the parameters of the information structure: supply 
functions are steeper with more noise in the private signals or more correlation among the 
costs parameters. In fact, for large values of noise or correlation supply functions are 
downward sloping, margins are larger than the Cournot ones, and as we approach the 
common value case they tend to the collusive level. Private information coupled with strategic 
behavior induces additional distortionary market power above full information levels and 
welfare losses which can be counteracted by subsidies. As the market grows large the 
equilibrium becomes price-taking, bid shading is of the order of 1/ n , and the order of 
magnitude of welfare losses is 1/ n
2 . The results extend to demand schedule competition and 
a range of applications in product and financial markets are presented. 
JEL Code: L13, D44, D82, G14, L94, E58, F13. 
Keywords: reverse auction, demand schedule competition, market power, adverse selection, 
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1. Introduction 
Many markets are characterized by traders competing in demand or supply schedules. 
This is very common in financial markets and some goods markets like wholesale 
electricity. Competition in supply functions has been used also to model bidding for 
government procurement contracts, management consulting, airline pricing reservation 
systems and provides a reduced form in strategic agency and trade policy models. And, 
indeed, the jury is still out on whether many markets are best described as being 
characterized by price or quantity competition and the supply function model appears as 
an attractive contender. In many situations private information is relevant and uncertainty 
has both a common and private values components. This is the case, for example, in both 
Treasury and central bank liquidity auctions as well as in the reverse auctions proposed 
by the Treasury to extract toxic assets from the balance sheets of banks. In this paper I 
present a model of strategic competition in schedules with an information structure which 
allows for private and common values, and does not need exogenous noise (e.g. noise 
traders or noisy supply), and explore the impact of private information on price-cost 
margins, bid shading, competitiveness, and welfare. 
 
Competition in supply schedules has been studied in the absence of uncertainty by 
Grossman (1981) and Hart (1985) showing a great multiplicity of equilibria.1 A similar 
result is obtained by Wilson (1979) in a share auction model. Back and Zender (1993) 
and Kremer and Nyborg (2004) obtain related results for Treasury auctions. Some of the 
equilibria can be very collusive. 2  Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show how adding 
uncertainty in the supply function model can reduce the range of equilibria and even pin 
down a unique equilibrium provided the uncertainty has unbounded support.3 In this case 
the supply function equilibrium always is between the Cournot and competitive 
                                                 
1   Grossman thought of firms signing implicit contracts with consumers that committed the firm to a 
supply function. Hart uncovers the equivalence between choosing a reaction function and a supply 
function. 
2   Back and Zender (2001) and LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) show how the auction can be designed to limit 
those collusive equilibria. 
3   In a linear-quadratic model this is a linear equilibrium.   2
(Bertrand) outcomes. This is also the result in Vives (1986) where the slope of the supply 
function is fixed by technological considerations. The supply function models considered 
typically do not allow for private information. 4   Kyle (1989) introduces private 
information into a double auction for a risky asset of unknown liquidation value and 
derives a unique symmetric linear Bayesian equilibrium in demand schedules when 
traders have constant absolute risk aversion, there is noise trading, and uncertainty 
follows a Gaussian distribution. Exogenous noise is needed to prevent fully revealing 
prices and the collapse of the market. 
 
Consider a market where n sellers compete to satisfy a downward sloping demand. Each 
seller receives a noisy signal of his uncertain private cost. We could consider the 
symmetric situation where n buyers with uncertain private valuations compete to fulfill 
an upward sloping supply schedule. In the paper we stick to the seller convention until we 
develop applications. The modeling strategy is to consider linear-quadratic payoffs 
coupled with an affine information structure, which admits common and private value 
components, that yields a unique symmetric linear Bayesian supply function equilibrium 
(LBSFE) of the game among the n sellers. We do not need to introduce noise in the 
system. The characterization of a linear equilibrium with supply function competition 
when there is market power and private information needs some careful analysis in order 
to model the capacity of a seller to influence the market price at the same time that the 
seller learns from the price. Kyle (1989) pioneered this type of analysis in a financial 
market context introducing noise trading in order to prevent prices from being fully 
revealing and the market collapsing. The present paper provides a tractable alternative to 
the models with an aggregate exogenous shock based on rational traders who are 
heterogeneous because of idiosyncrasies that translate in their market positions. 
 
It is found that there is a unique LBSFE except in the pure common value case. This 
equilibrium is privately revealing. That is, the private information of a firm and the price 
provide a sufficient statistic of the joint information in the market. This means in 
                                                 
4   Exceptions are the empirical papers of Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) and Kühn and Machado (2004) in 
electricity.   3
particular that the incentives to acquire information are preserved despite the fact that the 
price aggregates information. In fact, this is so even as we approach the common value 
case as long as the prior is diffuse enough or the marginal cost of acquiring precision at 0 
is null. We do not examine possible nonlinear equilibria. Linear equilibria are tractable, 
in particular in the presence of private information, have desirable properties like 
simplicity, and have proved very useful as a basis for empirical analysis. 
 
In the linear equilibrium with private information sellers are more cautious when they see 
a price raise since it may mean that costs are high. The more so, with sellers using steeper 
schedules, when signals are noisier or costs parameters more correlated. The market 
looks less competitive in those circumstances as reflected in increased price-cost margins. 
This is reminiscent of the winner’s curse in auctions. Indeed, the price has an informative 
role on top of its traditional capacity as index of scarcity. In fact, when the first effect is 
strong enough supply functions slope downwards and margins are larger than the Cournot 
ones. This is in contrast to the results of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) with symmetric 
information. More surprisingly perhaps, as we approach the common value case margins 
tend to the collusive level. Price-cost margins and bid shading increase with more 
correlation of cost shocks and/or noisier signals. This happens at the unique linear 
equilibrium only because of information-induced market power and not because of the 
existence of a vast multiplicity of equilibria. Relaxation of competition due to adverse 
selection in a common value environment is also obtained in Biais et al. (2000). I find 
also that price volatility is increasing in the noise of the signals and in the underlying cost 
volatility.   
 
When sellers face and inelastic demand then the comparative statics results on the 
information structure parameters hold but supply functions are always upward sloping. 
Indeed, the linear equilibrium breaks down when supply schedules become too steep. 
This is akin to the results of Kyle (1989) and Wang and Zender (2002) studying demand 
schedule competition. Interestingly, in our case the “linkage principle” of the auction 
literature according to which on average, the cost to the buyer decreases when providing 
suppliers with more information about the value of the good (Milgrom and Weber   4
(1982)), does not hold. In our case more public information enhances the informational 
role of the price and makes bidders more cautious instead of more aggressive.5 
 
A welfare optimal allocation can be implemented by a price-taking Bayesian supply 
function equilibrium. This is so since at a LBSFE there is a deadweight loss only because 
of strategic trading since the equilibrium is privately revealing. Sellers at the strategic 
equilibrium act as if there were price–takers but facing steeper marginal costs than the 
true ones. The difference in slopes, the distortion induced by private information, is 
increasing with the correlation of cost shocks and noise in the signals. This means that 
both aggregate/allocative and distributive/productive inefficiency increase with the size 
of the distortion implying too low sales and too similar sales among sellers. It is shown 
that a quadratic subsidy which lowers the perceived slope of marginal costs of sellers 
may alleviate or eliminate the distortion and improve efficiency. Furthermore, typically, 
the deadweight loss increases as we approach the common value case and with noisier 
signals. 
 
The paper considers also the large market case where the number of sellers and demand 
are replicated (n is the number of sellers and the size of the market as well). Then the 
distortion induced by private information and bid shading are decreasing in n, and the 
incentives to acquire information are preserved even as we approach the common value 
case as long as the prior is diffuse enough or the marginal cost of acquiring precision at 0 
is low enough. Furthermore, bid shading is of the order of 1/n, in a large market there is 
no efficiency loss (in the limit) and the order of magnitude of the deadweight loss is 
2 1/n . This is also the rate of convergence to efficiency obtained in a double auction 
context by Cripps and Swinkels (2006).  
 
The welfare evaluation of the LBSFE is in marked contrast with the Cournot equilibrium 
in the presence of private information. The reason is that the LBSFE aggregates 
                                                 
5    Perry and Reny (1999) show how, for related reasons, the linkage principle may fail in multi-unit 
auctions. 
   5
information but not the Cournot market.  The welfare analysis in the supply function 
model contrasts thus with the one in models where there is no endogenous public signal 
such as the Cournot market in Vives (1988), the beauty contest in Morris and Shin 
(2002), or the general linear-quadratic set up of Angeletos and Pavan (2007). With 
Cournot competition we have to add a deadweight loss due to lack of information 
aggregation. A large Cournot market does not aggregate information (i.e. a large Cournot 
market does not approach a full information competitive outcome) and in the limit there 
is a welfare loss due to private information.  
 
A leading application of the model to goods markets is to wholesale electricity. The 
model admits also other interpretations in goods markets. The cost shock could be related 
to some ex post pollution or emissions damage which is assessed on the firm. Before 
submitting its supply schedule a firm would receive some private information on this 
pollution damage. Still another interpretation of the shock would be a random 
opportunity cost of serving the market which is related to revenue management dynamic 
considerations.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the supply function model with 
strategic firms and characterizes a linear Bayesian supply function equilibrium and its 
comparative static properties. It includes results with costly information acquisition.   
Section 3 performs a welfare analysis characterizing the distortion at the LBSFE and 
deadweight losses, and showing how to implement the efficient allocation with price-
taking equilibria or with subsidy schemes.  Section 4 studies replica markets and 
characterizes the convergence to price-taking behavior as the market grows large and an 
analysis of the order of magnitude of deadweight losses. Section 5 presents welfare 
simulations results of the model and includes a comparison with Bayesian Cournot 
equilibria.  Section 6 introduces applications to electricity markets, pollution control, 
revenue management, strategic agency and trade policy, reverse auctions, and demand 
schedule competition in financial markets (to legacy loan auction, central bank liquidity 
and Treasury auctions). Concluding remarks, including potential policy implications,   6
close the paper. Most proofs and the analysis of endogenous information acquisition and 
the Bayesian Cournot model are gathered in the Appendix.  
 
2. A strategic supply function model 
Consider a market for a homogenous good with n sellers. Seller i faces a cost  
()
2
ii i i i Cx; x x
2
λ θ= θ +  
of supplying  i x units of the good where i θ  is a random parameter and λ > 0.6 Demand 
arises from an aggregate buyer with quasilinear preferences and gross 
surplus ()
2 Uy y y/ 2 =α −β , where α and  β   are positive parameters and y the 
consumption level. This gives rise to the inverse demand  
( ) Py y = α−β  
where y is total consumption. In a reverse auction, for example, the buyer presents the 
schedule  () Py y =α−β  to the sellers who will bid to supply. We will comment as we go 
along on how the results specialize to the case of inelastic demand and in Section 6 on 
how they can be reinterpreted for the case of demand instead of supply bids. Total surplus 
is therefore given by () () ii i ii TS U x C x , =− θ ∑∑ . 
 
We assume that  i θ   is normally distributed (with mean  0 θ > and variance
2
θ σ ). The 
parameters i θ  and  j θ , j≠ i, are correlated with correlation coefficient  [ ] 0,1 ρ∈ . So we 
have
2
ij cov , θ ⎡⎤ θθ = ρ σ ⎣⎦ , for j≠ i. Seller i receives a signal  ii i s = θ+ ε and signals are of the 
same precision with  i ε normally distributed with  i E0 ⎡⎤ ε = ⎣⎦  and [ ]
2
i var ε ε =σ . Error terms 
in the signals are uncorrelated among themselves and with the  i θ parameters. All random 
variables are thus normally distributed. 
 
                                                 
6    We could also deal easily with the case where there the seller faces an adjustment cost of the 
form () ii
2
/2 ˆ xx λ−  where  i ˆ x  is a target quantity for agent i.   7
Ex-ante, before uncertainty is realized, all sellers face the same prospects. It follows that 
the average parameter  ()
n
i i1 /n
= θ≡ θ ∑     is normally distributed with mean θ , 
() ()
2 var 1 n 1 / n θ ⎡⎤ θ= + − ρσ ⎣⎦
  , and  i cov , var ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ θ θ= θ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
   .  
 
Our information structure encompasses the cases of “common value” and of “private 
values”. For  1 ρ=  the θ parameters are perfectly correlated and we are in a common value 
model. When signals are perfect,  2 0 ε σ =  for all i, and 0 1 <ρ< , we will say we are in a 
private values model. Agents receive idiosyncratic shocks, which are imperfectly 
correlated, and each agent observes his shock with no measurement error. When  0 ρ = , 
the parameters are independent, and we are in an independent values model.  
 
Let  ()
222 / θθε ξ ≡σ σ +σ   , it is not difficult to see that () ii i Es s1 ⎡⎤ θ =ξ + −ξ θ ⎣⎦  and 
() ji ji i Ess E s s 1 ⎡⎤⎡⎤ =θ = ξ ρ + − ξ ρ θ ⎣⎦⎣⎦ . When signals are perfect,  1 ξ =  and  ii i Ess ⎡⎤ θ= ⎣⎦, 
and  () ji i Es s 1 ⎡⎤ θ= ρ + − ρ θ ⎣⎦ . When they are not informative,  0 ξ=  and 
ii ji EsEs ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ θ= θ= θ ⎣⎦⎣⎦.  
 
Under the normality assumption conditional expectations are affine. There are other 
families of conjugate prior and likelihood that also yield affine conditional expectations 
and allow for bounded supports of the distributions. (See Vives (Ch. 2, 1999)).7 
 
Sellers compete in supply functions. We will restrict attention to symmetric Linear 
Bayesian Supply Function Equilibrium (LBSFE). The characterization of an equilibrium 
with supply function competition when there is market power and private information 
needs to model the capacity of a seller to influence the market price at the same time that 
the seller learns from the price.  
                                                 
7    With normal distributions there is positive probability that prices and quantities are negative in 
equilibrium. This can be controlled by choice of the variances of the distributions and the 
parametersα , β ,  λ and  θ .    8
 
The strategy for seller i is a price contingent schedule  ( ) i Xs , ⋅ . This is a map from the 
signal space to the space of supply functions. Given the strategies of sellers () j Xs, ⋅ , j = 1, 
…, n, for given realizations of signals market clearing implies that  
( ) ( )
n
j j=1 pP X s , p = ∑ . 
Let us assume that there is a unique market clearing price  ( )( ) ( ) 1n ˆ p X s , ,...,X s , ⋅ ⋅  for any 
realizations of the signals.
8
  Then profits for seller i, for any given realization of the 
signals, are given by  
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) i1 n i i X s , ,...,X s , pX s ,p C X s ,p π⋅ ⋅ = −  
where  () () () 1n ˆ p p X s , ,...,X s , =⋅ ⋅ . This defines a game in supply functions and we want 
to characterize a symmetric LBSFE.  
 
Given linear strategies of rivals  ( ) jj Xs, p b a s c p = −+, j ≠ i, seller i faces a residual 
inverse demand 
() ( )( ) ji j i ji ji pX s , p x n 1 b c p a s x
≠≠ =α−β −β =α−β − + +β −β ∑∑ . 
 
Provided  () 1n 1 c 0 +β −>   it follows that  
() ( )
1
ii pI 1 n 1 c x
−
=− β+ β−  
where  
() () () ( )
1
ij ji I1 n 1 c n 1 ba s
−
≠ =+ β− α − − + ββ ∑ . 
 
All the information provided by the price to seller i about the signals of others is 
subsumed in the intercept of residual demand i I . The information available to seller i is 
therefore { } i s,p  or, equivalently, { } ii s,I . Seller i chooses  i x  to maximize 
                                                 
8   If there is no market clearing price assume the market shuts down and if there are many then the one 
that maximizes volume is chosen.   9
() () () ( )
1 2 2
i i i i ii i i i i ii E s,p x p E s,p x x I 1 n 1 c x E s,p x .
22
− λ λ
⎡π ⎤ = − ⎡θ ⎤ − = −β +β − − ⎡θ ⎤ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
The F.O.C. is 
() ( )
1
ii i i i i IE s , I 2 1 n 1 cx x0
−
−⎡ θ ⎤ − β+ β − − λ= ⎣⎦  
or, equivalently, 
( ) ii i pE s , p d x − ⎡θ ⎤ = +λ ⎣⎦ ,  
where  () ()
1 1 dn 1 c




pE s , p
Xs , p
d
− ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ =
+λ
. 
The second order sufficient condition for a maximum is 2d 0 +λ> . An equilibrium must 
fulfill also () 1n 1 c 0 +β − > .  It is worth noting that there is strategic complementarity in the 
slopes of supply functions for given predicted values  ii i tE s , p ≡ ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ . Indeed, for  given  i t t h e  
slope of  () i Xs , p is  () 1/ d+λ  which is increasing in the slope of the  (aggregate) supply 
function of the rivals () n1 c − . The following proposition characterizes the linear equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1. Let ρ < 1 and 
22
εθ σσ < ∞ / , then there is a unique symmetric linear Bayesian 
supply function equilibrium. It is given by the supply function 
() ( ) () ii i Xs , p p E s , p /d = −⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦  
with  () ()
1 1 dn 1 c
− − =β + − , cX / p ≡∂ ∂  is the slope of supply and is given by the  largest 
solution to the quadratic equation 








+ λβ − + + β+λ + λ −β −
+β + λβ − =
 
where 










−ρ σ + + − ρ σ
. The sensitivity to private information is 













= . In equilibrium we have that   10
() 1/ c M/ 1 M n λ> >− + β , a0 > , and c decreases with M and with λ. When M0 =  we 
have that c0 >  and c is increasing in n. When c0 >  then  ( ) n1 c − , and therefore 
1 d
−  are 
increasing in n. 
 
Proof: See Appendix I.  
 
Average quantity  is given by ( ) i i xx / n b a s c p ≡ =− + ∑     , where 
() () ii ii ss n n ≡= θ + ε ∑∑     . Substituting in the inverse demand pn x =α−β   and 
solving for p we obtain  
() ( )
1 p 1 nc nb nas
− =+ β α − β+ β  .9 
 
The price p reveals the aggregate information s  . The equilibrium is privately revealing 
(i.e. for seller i () i s,p  or () i s,s     is a sufficient statistic of the joint information in the 
market () 1n ss , . . . , s = , see Allen (1981)). In particular, in equilibrium we have that 
ii ii i Es , pEs , sEs ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦   . It is worth noting that key to the private revealing 
property of the equilibrium is that the same signal  i s   conveys information about the 
idiosyncratic component  ii η≡ θ− θ     and an aggregate component θ   (average cost 
parameter). Indeed, an equivalent formulation of the individual cost parameter has 
ii θ= θ + η   , where  i cov , 0 ⎡⎤ ηθ= ⎣⎦




= η = ∑ . 
 
Despite the fact that the LBSFE is privately revealing it is distorted in relation to the full 
information supply function equilibrium where sellers share  ( ) 1n ss , . . . , s =  (denoted by a 
superscript f). Indeed, following a similar analysis as before it is easy to see that 
() () ()
ff
ii Xs , p pE s/ d =− ⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦  where 
f d corresponds in Proposition 1 to the case 
                                                 
9   Note  that  since  () cM / 1 M n1 / n >− + β >− β  in  equilibrium  1n c 0 +β>  (and  then 
() 1c 1 n c c 0 n1 +β = +β −β > − , with either if c0 >  or c0 < , as posited to derive 
i I ).    11
M0 =  (in  which  case 
f cc = , where
f c   is given implicitly by the positive root of   
() ()
1 11 n1 c c
− −− β+ − + λ = ). Whenever there is no correlation between the cost parameters 
(0 ρ= ) or signals are perfect (the private values case with 
22 /0 εθ σ σ= ) 10,  M0 = , 
ii i ii Es , pEsEs ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ and seller i does not learn about  i θ  from prices. In these 
cases the LBSFE coincides with the full information equilibrium. When   0 ρ>  or 
22 /0 εθ σσ > sellers learn from prices and supply functions at the LBSFE are steeper: 
f cc <  
(and 
f dd > ).11  The price at a LBSFE serves a dual role as index of scarcity and as 
conveyor of information. This can be seen from the supply function 
() () () ii i Xs , p p E s , p /d =− ⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦ . Indeed, a high price has a direct effect to increase the 
competitive supply of a seller, but also conveys news that costs are high (since  ii Es , p ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣⎦  
is increasing in p).  
 
Comparative statics 
If ρ = 0 or 
22 /0 εθ σσ = then the price conveys no extra information on the costs of seller i, 
the equilibrium coincides with the full information equilibrium, and c> 0. The fact that 
f cc < is due to adverse selection.  As ρ or 
22 / ε θ σ σ  increase then the slope of the supply 
function becomes steeper (c decreases) because of the informational component of the 
price (i.e. the seller learns more from the price about its cost shock and reacts less to a 
price change than if the price was only an index of scarcity) and turns negative at some 
point. Indeed, it is easily checked that c decreases in ρ and
22 / ε θ σ σ . This follows from 
the fact that c decreases withM  and M  is in turn increasing in ρ and
22 / εθ σσ . Note that 
as 
2
ε σ  increases the private signal of a seller diminishes its precision in a one-to-one 
fashion while the precision in the price diminishes according to the factor () 1/ n 1 − . As ρ 
tends to 1, c becomes negative. There are particular parameter combinations (i.e. when 
                                                 
10    In this case the equilibrium is independent of ρand it exists even if 1 ρ = . 
11    It is worth noting that the equilibrium depends only on the ratio 
22 /
ε θ σ σ .   12
()
1 1 Mn 1
− − =+ λ β ) for which the scarcity and informational effects balance and sellers 
set a zero weight (c0 = ) on public information. In this case sellers do not condition on 
the price and the model reduces to the Cournot model where sellers compete in 
quantities. However, in this particular case, when supply functions are allowed, not 
reacting to the price (public information) is optimal. Figure 1 depicts the change in the 
equilibrium supply function as ρ goes from 0 to 1 for  i s = θ:  ( ) X, p θ . 
 
 
Figure 1. The LBSFE  () X, p θ  as ρgoes from 0 to 1. 
The results are reminiscent of asymmetric information models where traders submit 
steeper schedules to protect themselves against adverse selection (Kyle (1989), Biais, 
Martimort, Rochet (2000)).12 The phenomenon is akin to the winner’s curse in common 
                                                 
12   Kyle (1989) and Wang and Zender (2002) consider a common value model with noise. Biais et al. 
(2000) in a common value environment show that adverse selection reduces the aggressiveness of   13
value auctions (Milgrom and Weber (1982)): a bidder refrains from bidding aggressively 
because winning conveys the news that the signal the bidder has received was too 
optimistic (the highest signal in the pool). Bidders shade their bid more, to protect against 
the winner’s curse, the less precise their signals are. 13 In our model a seller refrains from 
competing aggressively with its supply function because a high price conveys the bad 
new that costs are high and the more so the less precise his signal is.14 
 
When increasing ρthe variance of aggregate fundamental volatility θ   also increases. In 
some situations we would like to know the impact of changing ρfor var⎡⎤ θ ⎣⎦
  constant. 
This will entail to decrease 
2
θ σ  appropriately. If we do so we will find that increasing ρ 
makes c smaller than when we allow var⎡ ⎤ θ ⎣ ⎦
    to change (this is so since 
() [] () ()
2 M/ 1 v a r v a r ε ⎡⎤ ≡ρ σ −ρ θ + ε ⎣⎦
     increases by more when we keep var⎡⎤ θ ⎣⎦
   constant). 
In short, in constant aggregate variance environments the impact of changes in 
correlation on the slope of supply is larger. 
 
Inelastic demand 
The case of inelastic demand where an auctioneer demands q units of the good is easily 
accommodated letting  β→∞ and  /q α β→ . Then  ( ) yp / q = α− β→ . It can be 
checked then that there is a unique symmetric LBSFE if only if n2M0 − −> . In this 












. A necessary condition for 
existence of the LBSFE is that n3 ≥ . As M increases,  n2M 0 − −→  and c0 →  and the 
LBSFE collapses. This is because of the combination of adverse selection and market 
power: the demand schedules become too inelastic to sustain a linear equilibrium as 
                                                                                                                                                 
competition in supply schedules of risk neutral uninformed market makers facing a risk averse 
informed trader who is subject also to an endowment shock. 
13   See also Reece (1978). 
14   This is also related to the generalized winner’s curse or “champion’s plague” pointed out in Ausubel 
(2004) for multi-unit auctions according to which, and translated in our context, the expected cost of a 
bidder conditional on being allocated a larger quantity is larger than with a smaller quantity.    14
n2M 0 −− →.15 This is similar to the double auction context of Kyle (1989) in which a 
linear equilibrium exists only if the number of informed traders is larger or equal than 3 
(when there are no uninformed traders). This is so since the market breaks down when 
traders submit vertical schedules. In our general model with strategic agents facing an 
elastic demand function from passive buyers this does not happen.  
 
Furthermore, with inelastic demand supply functions are always upward sloping (c0 > ).  
This is as in the auction models of Kyle (1989) or Wang and Zender (2002) where 
demand schedules always have the “right” slope: downwards.  As before, the supply 










Common values and information acquisition 
The equilibrium is in contrast with the pure common value model of Kyle (1989) where 
noise traders or noisy supply are needed in order to prevent the collapse of the market. In 
our model there is no noise and consequently in the pure common value case ( 1 ρ =  
and
2
ε σ< ∞ ) the market collapses. Indeed, when  1 ρ =  and 
2 0 ε < σ< ∞  a fully revealing 
REE is not implementable and there is no linear equilibrium. The reason should be well 
understood: if the price reveals the common value then no seller has an incentive to put 
any weight on its signal (and the incentives to acquire information disappear as well). But 
if sellers put no weight on their signals then the price can not contain any information on 
the costs parameters.  As 1 ρ→ , M →∞ and at the linear equilibrium in Proposition 1 we 
have that dn →β , (a0 → , c1 n →− β / , b n →α β / ) and the equilibrium collapses in the 
limit. In fact, the supply function of a seller converges to the per capita seller demand 
function  () xp n =α − β / . (See Figure 1.) As  1 ρ →  traders are less and less aggressive. 
This is so because of worsened adverse selection coupled with strategic complementarity 
in the slopes of the supply functions. Indeed, as other traders make steeper their supply 
                                                 
15   We do not examine the existence of potential nonlinear equilibria. Note, however, than in Battacharya 
and Spiegel (1991) when the linear equilibrium fails to exist there is no other equilibrium except a 
degenerate no-trade equilibrium.   15
functions the best reply of a trader is to do the same. This will have important implications 
for competitiveness. 
 
Do sellers have incentives to gather information? If the sellers receive the private signals 
for free, in the course of their activity for example, then this means that each seller has an 
incentive to rely on its private signal even though the price provides also information. 
Indeed, for seller i the signal  i s still helps in estimating  i θ  even though p reveals s   (i.e., 
the equilibrium is privately revealing).  
 
If the signals are costly to acquire and agents face a convex cost of acquiring precision 
then, even if there are many sellers in the market, each seller will have an incentive to 
purchase some precision for any correlation of the costs parameters which is not perfect 
provided that the marginal cost of acquiring precision is zero for zero precision or the 
prior diffuse enough. More precisely, consider a market where each seller can purchase a 
private signal at a cost, increasing and convex in the precision  i
2 1/ ε ε τ ≡σ of the signal, 
according to a smooth function  ( ) H ⋅   that satisfies H(0) = 0, H' 0 >  for  0 ε τ> , and 
H'' 0 ≥ . There are, thus, nonincreasing returns to information acquisition. We consider 
the case where each seller does not observe the precision purchased by other sellers and 
look therefore at a simultaneous move game where each seller chooses its precision and 
the supply function.  Denote by  ( ) ε ψ τ   the marginal benefit of acquiring precision 
evaluated at a symmetric solution and let  ( ) ( ) 0 0l i m 0
ε τ→ ε ψ ≡ψ τ > . It can be shown (see 
Proposition A.1 in Appendix II for a formal statement and proof of the result) that there is 
a symmetric equilibrium in the game with costly information acquisition provided that 
() () H' 0 0 <ψ  and 1 ρ< . At equilibrium sellers buy a positive precision of 
information
* 0
ε τ> . This is so in particular if  ( ) H' 0 0 =  or the prior is diffuse enough - θ τ  
small- (even if the number of sellers is large and/or ρ close to 1). As  1 ρ→  we have 
that () ( ) ()
1 2 02 2 n
−
θ ψ→ β + λ τ  . This means that for any n even as  1 ρ→  there  are 
incentives to acquire information when ( ) H' 0 0 = . The intuition is as follows. The   16
marginal benefit of acquiring precision is declining with the level  ε τ acquired and is 
positive for  0 ε τ=   with a finite number of sellers even if parameters are very correlated 
(a seller by purchasing a signal will improve the information he has on the common value 
even though he learns the signals of the other sellers through the price). When the number 
of sellers is large the improvement will be small but if the seller can purchase a little bit 
of precision at small cost it will do it.16  If   ( ) H' 0 0 >  then for n large enough there is no 
purchase of information.17  
 
If () () H' 0 0 ≥ψ   then there can not be any information acquisition in a symmetric 
equilibrium and in fact there is no equilibrium (provided that  ( ) H' 0  is not too high). We 
have that 
* 0 ε τ=  at a candidate equilibrium but this can not be an overall equilibrium 
since if other sellers do not purchase information then the price contains no additional 
information for a  seller and it will pay a single seller to get information (provided that 
() H' 0   is not too high). As parameters  , ,  and n β λρ move in such a way that 
() () 0H ' 0 ψ↓ , then
* 0
ε τ→  and the linear supply function equilibrium collapses.18 
 
Demand uncertainty 
Demand uncertainty can be incorporated easily in the model as long as it follows a 
Gaussian distribution. It would add noise to the demand function,  ( ) Py u y =α+ −β  with 
()
2
u uN 0 , σ ∼ , and to the inference problem of sellers but should not change the 
qualitative results. We would have a noisy linear equilibrium instead of privately 
                                                 
16   Jackson (1991) shows the possibility of fully revealing prices in a common value environment with 
costly information acquisition with a finite number of agents and under some specific parametric 
assumptions. 
17   However, there would be positive purchase for any n if the prior is diffuse enough in the natural case 
of a large market where the number of buyers and sellers grow together. See Section 6. 
18   Note that when 
22
εθ σσ → ∞ /  -in  which  case  ( ) Mn / 1 →ρ −ρ - the equilibrium in Proposition 1 
collapses also sincea0 → . However, in the limit 
22 /
εθ σ σ→ ∞  there is another linear equilibrium 
(even when  1 ρ= )   in which  () ()
f
Xp c p = −θ  (since  [ ]
ii Es , p θ =θ).   17
revealing since sellers would have on top of their private signal a noisy estimate of the 
average signal. A linear equilibrium would exist even in the common value case. Demand 
noise would lessen the adverse selection problem making the price less informative about 
the average signal but still for low enough demand noise we would have downward 
sloping supply functions in similar circumstances as in our model.19  As noise in the 
demand tended to zero the equilibrium would converge to our privately revealing 
equilibrium. In the other extreme, with infinite noise, the price would contain no 
information and sellers would rely only on their private signals.  
 
More in general, what makes our model tractable is the combination of a linear-quadratic 
payoff structure coupled with an affine information structure (that is, a pair of prior and 
likelihood that yields affine conditional expectations) that allows for the existence of 
linear equilibria. Here it is crucial that the slopes of demand and costs are not affected by 
uncertainty. Adding (intercept) demand uncertainty presents no problem as long as the 
affine information structure is kept. 
 
Competitiveness 
Seller i bids according to the supply function  () ( ) () ii i Xs , p p E s , p /d = −⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦  where 
the bid is “shaded” with respect to the expected marginal cost 
[ ] ii i i i EM C E s , p x ≡⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦  according to the factor  () ( )
1 1 dn 1 c
− − =β + − :   
[ ] ii i pEM C d x −= , 
This has a translation in terms of margins in the usual Lerner index form. Letting   
r
i p/dx η= be the elasticity of residual demand for seller i   
() ()
r1
j ji xp X s , p
−










                                                 
19   See Vives (2009).   18
The (absolute value of the) slope of residual demand is 
1 d
− .  We see therefore that the 
competitiveness of the LBSFE depends on d and the slope of supply c. A consequence of 
the comparative statics results is that the margin (and amount of bid shading) over 
expected marginal cost  ii i Es , p x ⎡θ ⎤+λ ⎣⎦  is increasing in 
2
ε σ  and ρ.  
 
We know from Proposition 1 that the aggregate slope of supply of rivals of a seller 
() n1 c −  increases (i.e. becomes flatter) with n whenever c > 0 for any n and therefore 
that  ()
1 n1 c
− β+ −  is increasing in n (and therefore d  decreasing in n). It follows that 
when c > 0 the margin is decreasing in n.  However, this need not hold when c< 0. 20 
 
A similar relation holds for the margin over average expected marginal cost  
[ ] ()
nn 1
nn i i i i i i1 i1 E M C E s,p x /n n E s,p x
−
== ≡ ⎡θ ⎤+λ = ⎡θ ⎤+λ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑∑   : 
[ ] nn pEM C d x − =    







pn 1n 1 c n
−
==
β η +β − η
 
 
where  () p/ nx η= β   is the elasticity of demand.  
 
Recall that in equilibrium  ii ii i Es , pEs , sEs ⎡θ⎤ = ⎡ θ⎤ = ⎡ θ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦    and  therefore 
nn 11
ii i i1 i1 nE s , p nE s E s E s
−−
== ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ = θ = θ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ∑∑        (the latter equality holding 
since  s     is a sufficient statistic for s in relation to θ   ). We have therefore that 
                                                 
20    Simulations show that another possible pattern is for ( ) n1 c −   to have a U-shaped form with n. 
Simulations have been performed for the range of parameters 
2
ε σ  and
2
θ σ  in [ ] 0.01,10.01  with step size 
2,  [ ] 0,0.9 ρ∈  with step size 0.1, and β  and λ in[ ] 1,10 , with step size 1, and n up to 30.   19
() pE s d x ⎡⎤ =θ++ λ ⎣⎦
      and from the demand function we obtain 
() () xE s / n d ⎡⎤ =α − θ β+ λ + ⎣⎦
       and therefore  [ ] ( ) ( ) Ex / n d = α−θ β +λ+   . It follows that 
the average expected output decreases (and expected price increases) with 
22 / εθ σσ  and ρ, 
and with 
1 n
− if  c0 >   (since in all these cases d increases).  Similarly, expected bid 
shading  [ ] dE x    increases with 
22 / ε θ σσ  and ρ, and with 
1 n
− if c0 > . 
 
We have also that  [ ] ()
2 var x n d var E s
− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =β+ λ + θ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
       and   [ ] () [ ]
2 var p n var x =β   , 
where  () Es s1 ⎡⎤ θ= ξ + − ξ θ ⎣⎦
      and  ( )
2 var / var / n ε ξ≡ ⎡θ⎤ ⎡θ⎤+σ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
   , 
() ()
2 var 1 n 1 / n θ ⎡⎤ θ= + − ρσ ⎣⎦
  . From this it follows that 
[ ]
2 var E s var s var ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ θ= ξ = ξθ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
       increases  in  ρ  and 
2
θ σ , and decreases in
2
ε σ . We 
conclude that price volatility decreases with 
2
ε σ and increases with 
2
θ σ  (since d increases 
with 
22 / εθ σσ ).  
 
The case c0 =   corresponds to a Bayesian Cournot equilibrium, where seller i sets a 
quantity contingent only on its information { } i s ,  and the aggregate margin is 1/nη (the 
unique Bayesian Cournot equilibrium is derived formally in Proposition A.3 in Appendix 
III). The supply function and the Cournot equilibrium coincide when  ()
1 1 Mn 1
− − =+ λ β, 
in which case c0 =  (indeed, then it can be checked that 
Cournot SF aa =  and 
Cournot SF b b = ). 
 
When  c0 > , we are in the usual case in which the supply function equilibrium has 
positive slope and is between the Cournot and the competitive outcomes (e.g. Klemperer 
and Meyer (1989) when uncertainty has unbounded support). However, when c0 <  the 
margin is larger than the Cournot level and, in fact, converges to the collusive level 1/η 
when 1 ρ→   (this is so since as  1 ρ →   ( ) 1c n 0 +β →  and  c 1/ n →− β ; therefore   20
() () 1n 1 c1 / n +β − → or dn →β   ). Indeed, if sellers were to share the signals 





i i1 x Max E s
= =





⎡⎤ π ⎣⎦ ∑
nn n 2




=− ⎡ θ ⎤ − ⎣⎦ ∑∑ ∑ , and (sufficient) F.O.C.  
n
ii i i1 2x E s x 0
= α− β −⎡ θ⎤ − λ= ⎣⎦ ∑ , i = 1, …, n. 
Adding up across sellers we obtain immediately 






where   [ ]
n 1
nn i i1 EM C n E s x
−
= =⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦ ∑     (as noted at a LBSFE we have that 
ii ii i Es , pEs , sEs ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦   ). It is also immediate that the (unconditional) expected 
average collusive output is ( ) ( ) /2n α−θ β +λ   and, indeed, at the LBSFE as 
1 ρ→ : [ ] () () ( ) ( ) Ex / n d /2n = α−θ β +λ+ → α−θ β +λ    since dn →β . 
 
It is remarkable that sellers may approach collusive margins in a one-shot noncooperative 
equilibrium because of informationally-induced market power. Let us recall that at the 
full information equilibrium (corresponding to  0 ρ = ), indicating the pure market power 
distortion in the market, the aggregate Lerner index would equal  () ( ) ( )
1
f 1n 1 c n
−
+β − η . 
As 1 ρ→ the private information distortion becomes more severe and sellers protect 
themselves by increasing the slope of their supplies in a escalation reinforced by strategic 
complementarity of slopes. The result is that the margin tends to the collusive level. 
 




   21
Proposition 2. At the LBSFE, with ρ < 1 and 
22
εθ σ σ< ∞ / : 
(i)  The slope of equilibrium supply is steeper (c smaller) with increases in ρ  and 
22
εθ σσ / , going from c0 >  for ρ = 0 or 
2 0 ε σ =  to c0 <  for large values of ρ  or 
22
εθ σσ / .  
(ii)  When c0 >  (c0 < ) the margin over average expected marginal cost is smaller 
(larger) than the Cournot level.  As  1 ρ→  the margin and expected output tend to 
the collusive level.  
(iii)  Expected bid shading and the margin are increasing in ρ or 
22
εθ σσ /  (and with 
1/nfor c0 > ). The opposite happens with the expected price. 
(iv)  Price volatility decreases with 
2
ε σ and increases with
2
θ σ . 
 
In the case of inelastic demand, in the range of existence n2M0 − −> ,  (i) holds (with 
c0 >  always), (iii) holds (and d is decreasing with n) and bid shading also increases with 
q (note that  [ ] nn pEM C d q / n −= ), and (iv) also holds (and  [ ] var p  increases also with 
ρsince in this case  [ ] var p var E s ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =θ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
    ). It is worth noting that according to (iii) the 
expected price and the payment of the buyer are increasing in the precision of public 
information
2 1 θ σ / . This is a failure of the “linkage principle” of the auction literature 
where on average, the cost to the buyer decreases by providing the bidders (suppliers) 
with more information about the value of the good (Milgrom and Weber (1982)). In our 
case more public information enhances the informational role of the price and makes 
bidders more cautious instead of more aggressive. It is worth noting that in our model 
increasing 
2 1 θ σ /   decreases both the variance of the common, var⎡⎤ θ ⎣⎦
  , and the 
idiosyncratic component,  [ ] i var η , of  i θ with more weight to the former the higher is ρ. 
 
3. Welfare analysis 
In order to assess the welfare loss at the LBSFE we provide an alternative outcome-based 
characterization of the equilibrium and compare it with the full information and with the 
fully efficient outcomes. At the full information equilibrium sellers have market power   22
and there is no private information. There is a welfare loss due to market power with 
respect to the efficient outcome. At the LBSFE there is on top a welfare loss due to 
private-information-induced extra market power. I show also that the efficient outcome 
can be implemented with a price-taking SFE. The section studies whether optimal 
subsidies can implement the efficient allocation and ends with a characterization of the 
deadweight losses at the LBSFE. 
 
3.1 An alternative characterization of the LBSFE outcome and welfare 
The strategies at a LBSFE induce the outcomes  () ( )
n
i i1 xs
= and  ( ) ps as a function of the 
realized vector of signals s. At the LBSFE we know that the price reveals s  and that 
ii ii i Es , pEs , sEs ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ = ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦   . It is easy to see then than the outcome at the LBSFE 







max E TS s x
2 = =
⎧ ⎫ ⎡⎤ − ⎨ ⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭ ∑  
where  () () ii i ii TS U x C x , =− θ ∑∑  and  () ( )
1 1 dn 1 c
− − =β + −  (where  c  is  the 
equilibrium LBSFE parameter). That is, the market solves the surplus maximizing 





d ˆ Cx , Cx , x
2
θ≡ θ+ . 
The result follows since the F.O.C. of the distorted planning problem are: 
( ) ii pE s d x 0 −⎡ θ⎤ − + λ = ⎣⎦ , i = 1, …, n, 
which are identical to those of the LBSFE since at the LBSFE:  ii i Es , pEs ⎡θ⎤ = ⎡ θ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ . 
 
It is worth to remark that, indeed, at the LBSFE bids are always shaded according to the 
distortion d,  () ii pE s d x =⎡ θ⎤ + + λ ⎣⎦ . The LBSFE allocation would be obtained by price-
taking sellers with distorted costs functions  ( ) ii ˆ Cx , θ  and full information s. However in   23
this case, supply functions would always be upward sloping,  ( ) () ii xp Es / d = −⎡ θ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦ , 
since there is no informative role for the price to play. 
 
Similarly, the full information supply function equilibrium can be obtained as the 
solution to a distorted planning program replacing d  by 
f d.   
 
It is clear that the full (shared-) information efficient allocation obtains setting d0 = . 
This is a Pareto optimal allocation and is characterized by the equality of price and 
expected marginal cost (with full information): 
ii i pE s , s x =⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦   ,  i = 1, .., n. 
 
The implied allocation is symmetric (since the total surplus optimization problem is 
strictly concave and sellers and information structure are symmetric).  
 
In order to understand the properties of the deadweight losses it is useful to look at 
outcomes for given predicted values for θ   with full information:  () 1n t t ,...,t = , 
ii tE s ≡⎡ θ⎤ ⎣⎦ , i =1, …, n. Note that 
nn 11
ii i1 i1 Esn E sn tt
−−
== ⎡⎤ θ =⎡ θ ⎤ =≡ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑ ∑     . To 
condition on t is equivalent to condition on s.   
 
The wedge d0 >   induces both distributive/productive and aggregate/allocative 
inefficiency. Distributive inefficiency refers to an inefficient distribution of 
sales/production of a given aggregate (average) quantity x   . Sellers minimize distorted 
costs  () ii ˆ Cx , θ  with d0 > , equivalent to a fictitious more convex technology, and the 
choices of individual quantities are biased towards too similar sales. Indeed, the market 
solves the program 
() () { } n
i i1
nn 1
ii i i1 i1 x




⎡⎤ θ= ⎣⎦ ∑∑    
yielding   () () ii ˆ xxt t / d =+− + λ     , i = 1, …, n, while the true cost minimization allocation 
would obtain setting d = 0. It follows that the total average minimized cost   24
() ()
n
ii i1 ˆ x;t,d E C x , t /n
=
⎡ ⎤ Ω≡ θ ⎣ ⎦ ∑    







∂Ω ⎛⎞ =− > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠ λ+ ∑   . 
Aggregate inefficiency refers to a distorted level of average quantity. With d0 >  average 
quantity for given t,  () ( ) Ex t t/ n d ⎡⎤ = α − β + λ + ⎣⎦     , is too low with respect to the optimal 
one -which corresponds to d = 0.  The latter would be the solution to  
( ) ( ) { } x max U nx x;t,d 0 −Ω =      . 
Average quantity is decreasing in d and, since total surplus is concave in x   , aggregate 
inefficiency increases with d. Since 
f dd 0 >>  the following ranking of expected average 
quantity at the LBSFE, full information equilibrium, and efficient allocation follows: 
[ ] () ()
f Ex Ex x / n ⎡⎤ << ≡ α − θ β + λ ⎣⎦    , and correspondingly expected prices follow the 
reverse ranking.  
 
The distortion 
f d can be assigned to standard market power (since sellers act with full 
information) while the additional distortion 
f dd 0 − >   can be assigned to increased 
market power induced by the private information. Increasing 
2
ε σ  or ρ increases 
f dd −  (by 
increasing d ) and therefore raise both aggregate and distributive inefficiency due to a 
worsened adverse selection problem. The distortion 
f d   decreases with n and the 
inefficiency is reduced (d decreases with n when c > 0 when may increase with n 
otherwise). The following proposition is then immediate. 
 
Proposition 3. Consider an allocation parameterized by d for a given realization of 
predicted values t. Then both aggregate and distributive inefficiency are increasing in d. 
Furthermore, for given t, 
(i)  Increases in 
2  or  ε ρσ  increase both types of inefficiency at the LBSFE both 
with respect to the efficient allocation and with respect the full information 
supply function equilibrium.   25
(ii)  As
2  or  ε ρσ  increase the inefficiency due to standard market power (
f d)  s t a y s  
constant while the one due to information-induced market power (
f dd − ) 
increases. 
(iii)  Increases in n reduce the inefficiency due to standard market power (
f d ) but 
need not reduce the overall one. 
 
The intuition for the result should be clear since increases in d , for a given realization of 
predicted values, reduce average output and bias individual outputs towards excessive 
similarity. We will see in section 3.3 how these results extend when averaging over the 
i t ´s, that is, when taking unconditional expectations. 
 
When demand is inelastic Proposition 3 holds with respect to distributive inefficiency 
(there is no inefficiency in the aggregate quantity) with the exception that now increases 
in n reduce the overall inefficiency also since they reduce n. 
 
3.2 Price-taking LBSFE and the efficient allocation 
Provided that 1 ρ< , 
2 0 θ σ> and
2
ε σ <∞, the efficient full information allocation is 
implemented by a symmetric price-taking LBSFE (denoted by a superscript “c” –for 
competitive– on the coefficients). The equilibrium strategy of seller i will be of the form 
()
cc c c
ii Xs , p b a s c p =− +  and it will arise out of the maximization of expected profits 




xi i i i Max p E s ,p x x
2
λ ⎧ ⎫ −⎡ θ ⎤ − ⎨ ⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
. 
This will yield the following system of F.O.C. 
ii i pE s , p x =⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦  for i = 1, .., n, 
where  () ( )
1 cc c p 1 nc nb na s
−
=+ β α − β + β    provided  that 
c 1n c0 +β≠ . In the linear 
equilibrium 
c 1n c +β   > 0 and
c a0 > . Therefore, p reveals s   ,  ii ii Es , pEs , s ⎡θ⎤ = ⎡ θ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦    , 
and the price-taking LBSFE implements the efficient solution.    26
 
The following proposition can be derived similarly as Proposition 1 (see Appendix I). 
 
Proposition 4. Let ρ < 1 and 
22
εθ σσ < ∞ / , then there is a unique symmetric price-taking 
LBSFE. This equilibrium implements the efficient allocation.  It is given by the supply 
function  () ()
c
ii i Xs , p pE s , p/ =− ⎡ θ ⎤ λ ⎣⎦ . The slope of supply is given by  
()





c  where M






+ −ρσ ++ −ρ σ
. 
We have that  ()
c 1/ c M/ 1 M n λ> >− + β  
c c  decreases  with  M  and  λ , and 
c c0 >  for 
















Note that we may have also 
c c  < 0.  As before the equilibrium supply function can be 
upward or downward sloping. It will be downward sloping when the reaction to private 
information is small (i.e. when we are close to the common value case, when prior 
uncertainty is low or noise in the signals is high). It is worth to remark that the price-
taking supply function will coincide with the marginal cost schedule only when there is 
no learning from prices (that is, when
2 0 ε ρσ= ). In this case  both boil down to 
ii i pE s x =⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦ . The supply functions always go through the point () x,p where 
() () x/ n ≡α − θ β+ λ and  () ( ) pn / n ≡λ α + βθ β+ λ. This follows easily from the fact 
that  () ()
cc X, px c p p θ= + −. As in the strategic case the supply function of a seller 
converges to the per capita seller demand function  ( ) xp n = α− β /  as  1 ρ→ . When ρ = 
0 we have that  ()
1
ii i xp E s
− =λ − ⎡θ ⎤ ⎣⎦  (M  = 0, 
c c1 / = λ, and 
cc b a = −θ ).  
 
For ρ < 1, and 
22
εθ σσ < ∞ / , the supply function of a seller in the price-taking equilibrium 
is always flatter than the supply function of the seller in the strategic equilibrium:   27
() ( ) ()
1 c1 cc d / M 10
− − −= λ− + λ + > 
since in equilibrium d0 > . It is immediate also that sellers are more cautious responding 













−= λ− + λ >
σ+ − ρσ
. 
By the same token, given that 
f dd 0 >>  we have that  
cf ccc >>  and 
cf aaa >> . 
 
This is because of the usual effect of market power: A seller takes into account the price 
impact coming from the amount sold. Note that in principle a seller with market power 
would also be cautious because of the informational leakage from his action, but here the 
equilibrium is revealing. It should be recalled also that here market power above the full 
information level 
f d  is induced by the adverse selection problem. 
 
Given that the outcome at the LBSFE is like in a price-taking equilibrium with steeper 
marginal costs (by the amount d ) the movements in the intercept of marginal costs will 
have damped effects on prices and quantities in relation to the “true” price-taking 
equilibrium. Indeed, we confirm in the simulations that price and average output 
volatility is always larger in the competitive case. Indeed, sellers react more to 
information in this case.  
 
3.3 Optimal subsidies 
From the results in Proposition 3 it may be conjectured that first best efficiency may be 
restored by a quadratic subsidy 
2
i x/ 2 κ  that “compensates” for the distortion 
2
i dx / 2 and 
induces sellers to act competitively. We will see that the conjecture is partially true, a 
quadratic subsidy can always reduce the distortion but can not eliminate it in some 
circumstances.21  
                                                 
21     See Angeletos and Pavan (2009) for a thorough analysis of tax-subsidy schemes in quadratic 
continuum economies with private information and with agents using non-contingent strategies (e.g. 
Cournot type).   28
The question is whether we can find a κ  (with  0 κ >   for a subsidy) such that 
() d λ−κ+ κ =λ or  () d κ= κ , where  () ( )( ) ( )
1 1 dn 1 c
− − κ ≡ β + − λ−κ  is the (endogenous) 
distortion when the slope of marginal cost is λ−κ. In this case a seller would act 
effectively as if he was competitive and facing a marginal cost with slope λ and the FOC 
would be  () () ii i i pE s d x pE s x 0 − ⎡θ ⎤− κ +λ−κ = − ⎡θ ⎤−λ = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . For a given κ<λand 
induced slope of marginal cost  0 λ−κ> , we know that  c/ 0 ∂ ∂κ >  since c is strictly 
decreasing in λ (Proposition 1). It follows that  ( ) d κ is decreasing in κ  up to κ=λ. 
Equivalently, and given Proposition 4, we have to find a κ such that  () ( )
c cc λ−κ = λ  
(and this will yield  () ( ) () ( )
1 1c dn 1 c
− − κ≡β + − λ ).  We have 
that () ( ) () ()
1 c1 c n M / M 1
− − λ= λ −β +  goes from +∞ to  ( ) M/ 1 M n − +β  as λ moves in 
the range  () 0,+∞ . Therefore given that  ( ) ( )
c cc λ >λ and that both are strictly 
decreasing in λ , for any  0 λ>   there is always a  0 κ >  such  that  () ( )
c cc λ−κ = λ  
provided that the range of  () c λ  is also from +∞to  ( ) M/ 1 M n − +β  as λ moves in the 
range  () 0,+∞ . This is so if and only if nM20 − −≥. In this case as  0 λ→ ,  () c λ→ ∞ . 
If nM20 −− <   then as  0 λ→ ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) cn M / n M 2 n λ →− − − − β (see the Lemma after 
the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix I). Then only if λ   is such that 
() ( )( )
c cn M / n M 2 n λ≤ − − − − β   we can find the desired 0 κ> . If 
() ( )( )
c cn M / n M 2 n λ> − − − − β then there is no  0 κ >  such that  ( )( )
c cc λ−κ = λ . (It 
would not help either to give a κ    so that   0 λ−κ<   since it can be checked that 
c/ 0 ∂∂ λ >for  0 λ< ). When nM2 < −  and  ( ) ( ) ( )
c cn M / n M 2 n λ >− − − − β then a 
quadratic subsidy can reduce the distortion d up to  ( ) d λ  (since d is decreasing in κ) but 
the first best is not attained.  
In summary: An appropriate quadratic subsidy reduces always the distortion d but can 
eliminate it completely only when n2M − ≥  or  when  n2M −<  and   29
() ( )( )
c cn M / n M 2 n λ≤ − − − − β . The optimal subsidy is given by 
() ( ) ()
1 1c *n 1 c
− − κ=β + − λ  if feasible to attain the first best or by  * κ =λ otherwise. In the 
first case the subsidy is increasing in M and λ  (since 
c c  decreases  with  M  and λ ). 
Indeed, the subsidy parameter  * κ depends in general on all the deep parameters of the 
model. This means that  * κ  increases with 
2 and  ε ρ σ . 
Note that the first best can always be attained when there is no adverse selection problem 
(M0 = ) and only standard market power.  
 
If demand is inelastic then   () ( )
1 c c M 1
−
=λ +  and  ( )() ( ) ( ) cn 2 M / n 1 1 M 0 = −− λ − + > 
and in both cases  c →∞as  0 λ→ . Therefore for any  0 λ >  there is always a  ( ) 0, κ∈ λ  
such that  () ( )
c cc λ−κ = λ .  This is precisely () ( ) ( ) () ( )
1 c *n 1 c 1 M / n 1
−
κ =− λ= λ + − . 
The subsidy  * κ  increases with 
22 , /  and  εθ ρσ σ λ, and decreases with n. 
 
3.4 Characterization of the deadweight losses 
The (expected) deadweight loss (DWL) at the LBSFE is the difference between expected 
total surplus at the LBSFE (ETS) and at the price-taking LBSFE (
c ETS ), ()
c ETS ETS − . 
It can be shown that 
() ( ) ( )
22 cc c
ii DWL ETS - ETS = n nE x x E x x / 2 . ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ≡β − + λ − ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
 
The result follows considering a Taylor series expansion of TS (stopping at the second 
term due to the quadratic nature of the payoff) around price-taking equilibria.22 The key 
to simplify the computations is to notice that at price-taking equilibria total surplus is 
maximized. Letting  ii uxx ≡−    and 
cc c
ii uxx ≡ −     , as in section 3.1, we can further 
decompose the total inefficiency in terms of aggregate and distributive inefficiency: 
                                                 
22   The result holds true, in fact, comparing a price-taking regime with any another regime which is based 
on weakly coarser information.   30
() () ( ) ()
22 cc c
ii ETS ETS n n E x x E u u / 2 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= β + λ − + λ − ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
   , 
where  () ()
2 c nn Exx / 2 ⎡⎤ β+ λ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
    corresponds to aggregate inefficiency (loss in surplus 
when supplying, in a cost-minimizing way, an average output x     different from the 
benchmark 
c x   ), and  ()
2 c
ii nE u u / 2 ⎡⎤ λ− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 to  distributive  inefficiency (supply of an 
average quantity in a non cost-minimizing way). The decomposition follows noting that 
if average quantities x   and 
c x     are supplied in a cost minimizing way then for all i, 
c
ii uu = . 
 
From the analysis in section 3.1 we have that for aggregate inefficiency, 
() ( ) () ( )
11 c xx n n d t
−− − = β+ λ − β+ λ + α −       
and therefore 
() () ( ) () ()
2 2 2 11 c Exx n n d E t
−− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= β + λ − β + λ + α − ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
     . 
 
We know that increases in ρ or 1/
2
ε σ increase the variance of the prediction tE s ⎡⎤ =θ ⎣⎦
      . 
 From this it follows that 
2 Et ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦    and therefore  ()
2
Et ⎡ ⎤ α−
⎣ ⎦
   increase in ρ and decrease 
in
2
ε σ . This is bad for aggregate efficiency. Since d  increases in ρ (for
2 0 ε σ> ) we can 
conclude that aggregate inefficiency increases with ρ. We have also that d  increases in 
2
ε σ  and it can be checked that aggregate inefficiency may be non-monotonic with respect 
to 
2
ε σ   (although it tends to be increasing in 
2
ε σ  for ρ not too small). 
 
We have that for distributive inefficiency,  ( ) () ii i uxxt t / d ≡ −= − λ +      and 
()
cc c
ii i uxx t t / ≡−=− λ     . Therefore: 
() () ( ) ()
2 2 2 1 c1
ii i Eu u d Et t
− − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= λ − λ + − ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
     31
where  ii tE s ≡⎡ θ⎤ ⎣⎦ .  
 
The deadweight loss due to distributive inefficiency increases with 
()
2
i Et t ⎡⎤ −
⎣⎦
  = ( ) ii i var t t var var s ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ −⎤= θ− θ− θ− θ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦⎣ ⎦
     . Indeed with  i tt =   , i = 1, …, n, 
there would be no distributive inefficiency. This would happen with  1 ρ=  or 
2
ε σ= ∞ . 
Increasing  ρ  aligns  probabilistically  i with  θ θ    and  increasing 
2
ε σ  increases 
() i var s ⎡⎤ θ− θ ⎣⎦
  , both reduce  i var t t ⎡ −⎤ ⎣ ⎦   . It can be checked with simulations (see Section 
5 for details of simulations) that  ()
2
i Et t ⎡ ⎤ −
⎣ ⎦
   is decreasing in ρ and
2
ε σ . The effect of  ρ 
(
2
ε σ ) on  ()
2
i Et t ⎡⎤ −
⎣⎦
   is particularly strong when 
2
ε σ  (ρ) is small. 
 
If  0 ρ=  then  d   is independent of 
2
ε σ   and aggregate and distributive inefficiency 
decrease in 
2
ε σ . In consequence, DWL is decreasing in 
2
ε σ  
 
If 
2 0 ε σ=  then  d  is  independent  of  ρ   and aggregate inefficiency increases in ρ  and 
distributive inefficiency decreases in ρ . The second effect dominates always in our 
simulations and the DWL is decreasing inρ 
 
The welfare loss induced by standard market power, that is, with respect to the full 
information allocation, is given by 
() () () ()
22 cf f c f c
ii ETS ETS n n E x x E u u / 2 ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −= β + λ −+ λ− ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
 
and since  neither ρ  nor 
2
ε σ  affect 
f d   it follows that both aggregate and distributive 
inefficiency decrease in 
2
ε σ  and therefore the deadweight loss is decreasing in 
2
ε σ , and 
aggregate (distributive) inefficiency increases (decreases) in ρ.   
   32
The following proposition summarizes the formal results thus far. We know that for 
given predicted values t both types of inefficiency increase with ρand 
2
ε σ  but changes in 
those parameters change the probability distribution over t.  
 
Proposition 5.  
(i)  The deadweight loss due to aggregate inefficiency increases always inρ while 
distributive inefficiency may increase or decrease in ρ .  If 
2 0 ε σ=  then 
distributive inefficiency decreases in ρ.  
(ii)  Both the deadweight loss due to aggregate and distributive inefficiency may 
increase or decrease in
2
ε σ .  If  0 ρ =  then they both decrease in
2
ε σ .  
(iii)  With respect to the welfare loss induced by standard market power:  both 
aggregate and distributive inefficiency decrease in 
2
ε σ , and aggregate 
(distributive) inefficiency increases (decreases) in ρ.   
 
In the case of inelastic demand the results for distributive inefficiency apply. 
 
Simulations show that the central scenario for the comparative statics of the DWL with 
respect to ρ and 
2
ε σ   confirm the results of Proposition 4 derived for given predicted 
values of cost parameters provided that ρand 
2
ε σ are not too small.  In this case, increases 
in 
2  or  ε ρσ  increase both aggregate and distributive inefficiency at the LBSFE both with 
respect to the efficient allocation and with respect the full information supply function 
allocation. However, increasing  ( )
2
ε ρ σ  may decrease the DWL when  ()
2
ε σρ  is small.23 
 
The intuition for the result is that for given t increases in 
2 or  ε ρ σ  increase both aggregate 
and distributive inefficiency. When averaging over predicted values distributive 
                                                 
23   See Section 5 for details of the simulations.   33
inefficiency decreases with increases in 
2 or  ε ρ σ  and the effect overwhelms the impact 
given t when 
2
ε σ  (orρ) are small enough. 
 
In the central scenario of the simulations increases in 
2 or  ε ρ σ  increase the DWL due to 
private-information-induced market power (the total DWL minus the DWL in the full 
information equilibrium). This so since the DWL tends to increase with increases in 
2  or  ε ρσ  while the DWL in the full information equilibrium diminishes with 
2
ε σ always 
and distributive inefficiency also diminishes withρ. 
 
4. Convergence to price-taking behavior in large markets 
In order to study how fast the inefficiency of supply function equilibria disappears in 
large markets we consider replica markets where the numbers of sellers and buyers grow 
at the same rate n. More precisely, suppose that there are n buyers, each with quasilinear 
preferences and benefit function  ( )
2 ux x x/ 2 =α −β  where x is the consumption level. 
This gives rise to the inverse demand  ( ) n Py y / n =α−β  where y is total consumption. 
There are n sellers as before. Total surplus is therefore given by 
() ( ) ii i TS nu y/n C x , =−θ ∑   and per capita surplus by 
() ( ) () ii i TS/n u y/n C x, /n =− θ ∑ .  
 
We will denote with subscript n the magnitudes in the n-replica market. The results we 
have obtained so far, except possibly comparative statics with respect to n, hold replacing 
β beta by / n β . In the n-replica market the distortion at the LBFSE is 
() ()
1 1
nn dn n 1 c
− − =β +− .  It is also true that 
f
n c  increases in n. Using simulations it can be 
checked that the aggregate slope of supply of rivals of a seller ( ) n n1 c −  increases (i.e.   34
becomes flatter) with n whenever  n c   > 0 for any n  24and that  ()
1
n nn 1 c
− β+ −  is 
increasing in n always (and therefore  n d  decreasing in n). It follows that the margin is 
decreasing in n.  The same is true of the optimal subsidy 
() ( ) ()
1 *1 c
nn nn 1 c
− − κ=β + − λ when the distortion can be eliminated since it can be checked 
that it is strictly decreasing in n.  
 
It is worth noting also that if we want to keep  n var⎡ ⎤ θ ⎣ ⎦
  constant when increasing n (which 
will mean to decrease 
2
θ σ  appropriately since  n var⎡ ⎤ θ ⎣ ⎦
   is decreasing in n), then  n c  will 
be smaller than when we allow  n var⎡ ⎤ θ ⎣ ⎦
   to vary (this is so since  n M  increases by more 
when we keep  n var⎡⎤ θ ⎣⎦
   constant). This will mean that the distortion  n d  will be larger.  
 
We can examine the incentives to acquire information in the replica market (see 
Appendix II). The same characterization as in Section 2 holds but now as  1 ρ→  we have 




θ ψ→β + λ τ . This means that ρ close to 1 for any number of sellers we 
will need the same degree of diffusion of the prior in order to have positive precision 
acquisition.  
 
What happens in a large market (that is, a market where the limit n →∞ is taken first)? 






∞ε → ∞ ε −
εθ
ψτ≡ ψτ=
λτ+ τ − ρ













                                                 
24    Another possible pattern is for () n n1 c −   to have a hump-shaped form with n being positive and 
increasing first to become decreasing and eventually negative (
n c  may increase or decrease with n). 
See Section 5 for the details of the simulations.   35
This yields  () 12 H ' 0 θ ρ= −τ λ . There is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the game 
with costly information acquisition provided thatρ <ρ. Indeed, then we have  () 00 ∞ φ > , 
()0 ∞ φ∞ < and  0 ∞ ′ φ< where  ( ) ( ) ( ) H' ∞ε ∞ε ε φτ≡ ψτ− τ. 
 
In summary, in a large market, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the game with 
costly information acquisition provided that () 12 H ' 0 θ ρ<ρ≡ −τ λ . With  1 ρ<  this is so 
in particular if  () H' 0 0 =  or the prior is diffuse ( θ τ  small). At equilibrium sellers buy a 
positive precision of information 
* 0
ε τ > . As ρ →ρ we have that 
* 0
ε τ →  and the linear 
supply function equilibrium collapses. 
 
Remark: We could also consider the case where information acquisition is observable in 
a first stage of the game and then at a second stage sellers compete in supply functions 
for given precisions. In this case we add a strategic effect of information acquisition and 
the characterization is much more involved. However, it is possible at least to check that 








 as 1 ρ→ .) 
 
We show next how equilibria in finite economies become price-taking. We characterize 
the rates of convergence and the order of magnitude of the deadweight loss at the LBSFE. 
 
Before stating the convergence results we will recall some measures of speed of 
convergence. We say that the sequence (of real numbers)  n b  is of the order n
υ, with υ a 
real number, whenever  n n nb k
−υ ⎯⎯ → for some nonzero constant k. We say that the 
sequence of random variables { } n y  converges  in  mean square to zero at the rate 
r 1/ n (or that  n y  is of the order 
r 1/ n ) if  ()
2
n Ey ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦ converges to zero at the rate 




⎣⎦   is of the order 
r 1/n ). Given that () [] ( ) []
2 2
nnn Ey E y v a r y ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦ , a   36
sequence { } n y  such that  [ ] n Ey = 0 and  [ ] n var y  is of the order of 1/n, converges to zero 
at the rate 1/ n .  
 
In our case  ()
n
ni i1 /n
= θ≡ θ ∑     is normally distributed with mean θ 
and () ()
2
n var 1 n 1 /n θ ⎡⎤ θ=+−ρ σ ⎣⎦
  . We have therefore that  n θ →θ    in mean square at the 
rate 1/ n  where θ    is normally distributed with mean θ and variance
2
θ ρσ .  
 
The following proposition characterizes the convergence of the LBSFE to a price-taking 
equilibrium as the market grows. As we have seen before the price-taking equilibrium is 
first best efficient since it aggregates information. 
 
Proposition 6. As the market grows large the market price  n p  (at the LBSFE) converges 
in mean square to the price-taking Bayesian price 
c
n p   at the rate of 1/n . (That is, 
()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
  tends to 0 at the rate of
2 1/n .) The deadweight loss at the LBSFE 
()
c
nn ETS ETS /n −  is of the order of
2 1/n . 
 
The rate of convergence to price-taking behavior is 1/n, which is the same as the usual 
rate under complete information. This is a statement that bid shading is of the order of 
1/n. It follows from the fact that the distortion  n d is of order 1/n (alternatively because 
the difference in equilibrium parameters 
c
nn aa −  and 
c
nn cc −  is of the order of 1/n) and 
both equilibria aggregate information -  n p  and 
c
n p  depend on the average signal  n s   . The 
departure from price taking (marginal cost) is of the order of 1/n and the deadweight loss 
is of the order of the square of it. (See proof in Appendix I.)  This result should not be 
surprising since the LBSFE aggregates information. Cripps and Swinkels (2006) obtain a 
parallel result in a double auction environment. The authors consider a generalized 
private value setting where bidders can be asymmetric and can demand or supply 
multiple units. Under some regularity conditions (and a weak requirement of “a little   37
independence” where each player’s valuation has a small idiosyncratic component), they 
find that as the number of players grows (say that there are n buyers and n sellers) all 
nontrivial equilibria of the double auction converge to the competitive outcome and 
inefficiency vanishes at the rate of 
2 1/n
−α for any  0 α > .  
 
As in Kyle (1989) we could ask what happens when the total amount of precision 
available to agents is fixed as the market grows large. Then as n tends to infinity  0 ε τ→ . 
In this case it is easy to see that  the market collapses and the supply function of a seller 
converges to the per capita demand.25  Therefore the non-competitive limit of Kyle does 
not arise in our private value environment. 
 
At the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium Proposition 6 holds (with the important proviso that 
now  ()
c
nn ETS ETS /n −   is the deadweight loss with respect to the price-taking 
equilibrium but not with respect to the full information first best, see Appendix III). The 
price-taking Bayesian Cournot equilibrium coincides with the full information first best 
in a large economy only in the independent values case, where there is no aggregate 
uncertainty (see Vives (2002)). Otherwise, as the market grows large there is no 
convergence to a full information equilibrium.  
 
In summary, convergence to price-taking is, in both cases, at the rate of 1/n for prices 
and 
2 1/n  for the welfare loss with respect to price-taking behavior. 
 
5. Simulations and comparison with Cournot 
In this section we simulate the n-replica market and compare the efficiency properties of 





                                                 
25   This is so since in this case as n →∞ 
n M →∞.   38
5.1 Simulating the deadweight losses 
In the central scenario of the simulations26 increases in 
2 or  ε ρ σ  increase the (per capita) 
deadweight loss at the LBSFE both with respect to the efficient allocation 
( ()
c
nn DWL/ n ETS ETS / n ≡− ) and with respect the full information supply function 
allocation (()
f
nn ETS ETS / n − ). (See Figure 2a, b). However, increasing  ()
2 resp.  ε ρσ  may 
decrease  DWL/ n  when  ()
2 resp.  ε σρ   is small (see for example in Figure 2.b that the 
effect of increases in 
2
ε σ  are small when  ρ is small). The deadweight loss decreases with 
ρ(resp. 
2
ε σ  ) whenever 
2
ε σ  (resp. ρ) is small.27 
 
                                                 
26    Simulations have been performed for  { } and   in 1,5 βλ ,  [ ] 0.01,0.99 ρ∈   with step size 0.01,  
2
ε σ  
and [ ]
2 in 0.01,10.01
θ σ  with step size 2, and  [ ] n2 , 8 2 ∈  with step size 20. (When needed we extend the 
simulations to  [ ]  in 0.001,0.999 ρ  with step size 0.001 and 
2
ε σ [ ] in 0,10  with step size 0.01.) In this 
range of simulations and with  30 θ= ,  50 α =  the probability of a negative output is at most 15% in 
either the SFE (strategic or competitive versions) or the Cournot equilibrium and the upper bounds are 
attained only when  5 and  1 β =λ = . Otherwise the probabilities of negative output tend to be very low. 
27   In our range of simulations we confirm that the total DWL decreases in ρ (
2
ε σ )  when 
2
ε σ  (ρ) is small 
(in our case below
2 0.07
ε σ=  (or below  0.01 ρ = ).    39


















Figure 2a.  ()
c
nn DWL/ n ETS ETS / n ≡−  as a function of ρ (with parameters  1 β=λ= , 
30 θ= ,  50 α= ,
22 1 θε σ= σ=) 
 





















Figure 2b.  ()
c
nn DWL/ n ETS ETS / n ≡−  as a function of
2
ε σ  (with parameters  1 β=λ= , 
30 θ= ,  50 α= ,
2 1 θ σ=, and n = 10) 
   40
It is also found that DWL/ n decreases as the market gets large (i.e. with n, see Figure 
2.a) and that the rate of decrease is slow for low
2
θ σ . This is driven by the decrease in  n d 
with n (which overwhelms the fact that when averaging over predictions both 
()
2
n Et ⎡⎤ α−
⎣⎦
   and  ()
2
in Et t ⎡⎤ −
⎣⎦
    tend to increase with n). Typically, the speed of 
convergence of the deadweight loss to zero (in terms of the constant of convergence) is 
slower when ρ is larger. That is, the limit as n tends to infinity of  ()
c
nn nE T S E T S − is 
increasing with ρ. (This is so since ( )
c
nn ETS ETS −  is typically increasing in ρ for any n 
and the limit of  ()
c
nn nE T S E T S − as n tends to infinity is well defined.) 
 
It is worth noting also that the (per capita) deadweight loss at the full information 
equilibrium (()
cf
nn ETS ETS / n − or deadweight loss due to standard market power) also 
decreases with n but that the (per capita) deadweight loss due to the private-information-
induced market power (that is, ()
f
nn ETS ETS / n − may increase with n for n low). This is 
due to the fact that the deadweight loss due to standard market power falls more sharply 
at the beginning that the one due to the private information induced market power.28 
 
5.2 Comparison with Cournot 
The welfare evaluation of the LBSFE is in marked contrast with the Bayesian Cournot 
equilibrium. At the LBSFE sellers act with full information and the deadweight loss is 
due to market power (which is increased in equilibrium due to adverse selection). There 
would be no welfare loss if sellers would act as price takers. At the price-taking Bayesian 
Cournot equilibrium there is always a welfare loss because the Cournot market 
mechanism does not aggregate information.29 
                                                 




ε σ= and 
0.9 ρ = . 
29   Except possibly with constant marginal costs (see Palfrey (1985) and Vives (1988). However, a price-
taking Bayesian Cournot equilibrium is team optimal (i.e. maximizes total expected surplus subject to the 
constraint that sellers use decentralized -quantity- strategies in information, see Vives (1988)).   41
 
It is worth to compare the relative efficiency of the Cournot market (
Cournot
n ETS ) in 
relation to the supply function market (
SF
n ETS ) in per capita terms. A typical pattern for 
moderate n is for ()
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n −  to be positive for ρ close to zero and negative 
for ρclose to 1, being zero at the point for which the supply function equilibrium calls 
for a vertical supply. For large n we may have ( )
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 − >  all  along 
(except for ρ very close to 1). (See Figure 3a.) In fact, for a given ρ and for large n we 
have always that ()
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 −> . (See Figure 4.) Furthermore, when signals 
are perfect (
2 0 ε σ= ) we have also that ( )
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 − >  always. When signals 
are close to perfect we have that ( )
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 − >  except for ρ very close to 1. 
The typical pattern of ()
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n −  as a function of 
2
ε σ  is similar to ρ, being 
positive for 
2
ε σ   small and negative for 
2
ε σ   large, and zero at the point for which the 
supply function equilibrium calls for a vertical supply. (See Figure 3b.) 
 


















Figure 3a. Efficiency differential between supply function and Cournot equilibria as a 
function of ρ (with parameters  1 β=λ= ,  30 θ = ,  50 α = , and 
22 1 εθ σ =σ = )   42


















Figure 3b. Efficiency differential between supply function and Cournot equilibria as a 
function of 
2
ε σ  (with parameters  1 β =λ= ,  30 θ = ,  50 α = , 
2 5 θ σ = , and  0.5 ρ= ). 
 

















Figure 4. Efficiency differential between supply function and Cournot equilibria as a 
function of n (with parameters  1 β=λ= ,  15 θ = ,  20 α = , 
2 1 θ σ = , and 
2 5 ε σ= ).   43
 
The intuition for the results should be clear. The supply function market always 
dominates in efficiency in terms of information because sellers have full information 
(although they do not behave as in a full information equilibrium) while in the Cournot 
market they do not. For 
2
ε σ  or ρ  small the supply function market dominates overall 
because on top sellers have less market power (since supply functions slope upwards). 
The result is that 
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS 0 −>  for 
2
ε σ or ρ small. For larger ρ and 
2 0 ε σ>  (or 
for larger 
2
ε σ  and  0 ρ> ) when supply functions slope downwards, sellers in the supply 
function market have more market power and this may dominate the information effect 
for n low, with the result that 
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS 0 − < . At the critical value of ρ (or 
2
ε σ ) 
for which the supply function equilibrium calls for a vertical supply we have 
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS 0 −=  since then both equilibria coincide. For n large the market power 
effect is not very important and we may have that( )
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 − > .  
 
Indeed, for n large, for a fixed ρ, we must have ( )
SF Cournot
nn ETS ETS /n 0 − >  since, as we 
have seen, as n grows the supply function equilibrium converges to the (full information) 
first best but not the Cournot equilibrium. At the LBSFE there is only a deadweight loss 
due to market power (which is aggravated by the adverse selection problem), which 
dissipates in a large market; at the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium the deadweight loss due 
to private information remains in a large market. It is worth noting that the welfare loss at 
the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium increases withρ. 
 
The comparison between the Cournot and supply function outcomes has practical 
implications.  
 
First when a supply function market is modeled, for convenience, à la Cournot we want 
to know what biases are introduced. The result is that in a market characterized by supply 
function competition using the Cournot model overestimates the welfare loss with respect 
to the actual supply function mechanism on two counts when supply function slope   44
upwards: excessive market power and lack of information aggregation. When the 
equilibrium supply function slopes downwards the Cournot market underestimates 
market power and then the comparison is ambiguous: the Cournot market may under- or 
overestimate the deadweight loss in relation to supply function competition. In a large 
market the Cournot model always overestimates the welfare loss since at the LBSFE 
there is (almost) no efficiency loss while there is a significant one with Cournot 
competition due to private information. 
 
Second, when sellers are restricted to use upward sloping schedules they may end up 
using vertical ones when in the supply function equilibrium they would be called to use 
downward sloping ones. The restriction to upward sloping schedules caps the market 
power of sellers in the supply function market. Forcing sellers to use increasing schedules 
when they would like to use decreasing ones may or not may be a good idea depending 
basically on the number of sellers. It will be good when the number of sellers (and size of 
the market) is moderate.  
 
6. Applications  
In this section we provide several applications of the model: electricity markets, agency 
and strategic trade policy, pollution damages, revenue management, and financial 
markets. We consider first supply schedule competition examples first and then we move 
on to demand schedule competition. 
 
6.1 Supply schedule competition 
Wholesale electricity markets 
A potential application of the model is to competition in wholesale electricity markets: 
the day-ahead or spot market, with separate auctions for each delivery period (half-hourly 
or hourly), and the balancing market, that secures that demand and supply match at each 
point in time. Those markets are typically organized as uniform price multiunit auctions. 
In the British Pool, the first liberalized wholesale market, generators had to submit a   45
single supply schedule for the entire day.30 Over this period residual demand facing a 
firm may vary considerably due to demand uncertainty and plant outings. The rules 
typically require producers to submit nondecreasing (step) function offers (although in 





In our modeling the supply functions are smooth (the old English pool was modeled like 
this by Green and Newbery (1992) and Green (1996, 1999)) while typically supplies are 
discrete. The modeling of the auction with discrete supplies leads to existence problems 
of equilibrium in pure strategies (see von der Fehr and Harbord (1993)). However, 
Holmberg at al. (2008) show that if prices are selected from a discrete grid, where 
(realistically) the number of price levels is small in comparison to the number of quantity 
levels, then the step functions converge to continuous supply functions as the number of 
steps increase. This justifies the approximation of step-functions with smooth supply 
functions. The linear supply function model has been widely used in electricity markets 
and new developments include cost asymmetries, capacity constraints, piecewise affine 
supply functions and non-negativity generation constraints (see Baldick, Grant, and Kahn 
(2004) and Rudkevich (2005)). Furthermore, empirical studies of the Texas balancing 
market suggest that the continuous supply approach approximates well the behavior of 
the largest producers in the Texas balancing market (ERCOT).32  Baldick and Hogan 
(2006) justify to concentrate attention on linear (affine) supply function equilibria in a 
                                                 
30   The British Pool was replaced by NETA in 2001, in this system the balancing mechanism auction is 
not uniform. 
31   In the day-ahead market in the Spanish pool generators submit supply functions which have to be 
nondecreasing and can include up to 25 price-quantity pairs for each production unit, as well as some 
other ancillary conditions. The demand side can bid in a similar way and the market operator 
constructs a merit order dispatch by ordering in the natural way supply and demand bids. The 
intersection of the demand and supply schedules determines the (uniform) price. Once the market 
closes the system operator solves congestion problems and market participants may adjust their 
positions in a sequence of intra-day markets, which have similar clearing procedures as in the day-
ahead market. (See Crampes and Fabra (2005).) 
32   See Niu et al. (2005), Hortaçsu and Puller (2008), and Sioshansi and Oren (2007).   46
linear-quadratic model because other equilibria (in the range between the least 
competitive Cournot one and the most competitive) are unstable.33 
 
Both strategic behavior and private information are relevant in electricity markets. There 
is ample evidence by now that firms bid over marginal costs (see, e.g. Borenstein and 
Bushnell (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002), Green and Newbery (1992), and Wolfram 
(1998)). Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) introduce private information on the contract 
positions of firms in the Texas balancing market (the day-ahead market is resolved with 
bilateral contracts).34  Information on costs is available because the balancing market 
takes place very close to the generation moment and also from information sellers. Kühn 
and Machado (2004) introduce private information on retail sales in their study of 
vertically integrated firms in the Spanish pool. Private cost information related to plant 
availability will be relevant when there is a day-ahead market organized as a pool where 
firms submit hourly or daily supply schedules.35 This means that the residual demand 
faced by a firm will be random since the supply of other firms depends on plant 
availability, which is random. The firm may have privileged information because of 
technical issues or transport problems. Furthermore, hydro availability in the reservoirs of 
each firm as well as the terms of supply contracts for energy inputs or imports are also 
private information. The latter include constraints in take-or-pay contracts for gas where 
the marginal cost of gas is zero until the constraint –typically private information to the 
firm– binds, or price of transmission rights in electricity imports depending on the private 
arrangements for the use of a congested interconnector. (It is worth noting that even if the 
opportunity costs of the inputs are the prices of those inputs in international markets in 
many instances there is not a single reference market.) Furthermore, in an emission rights 
system, future rights allocations may depend on current emissions and firms may have 
                                                 
33   Unstable in the sense that a small perturbation from the equilibrium supply functions induce sellers to 
deviate still more from the equilibrium. 
34   The authors also argue that to take a linear approximation to marginal costs in the Texas electricity 
market is reasonable. 
35   Note that even if there was a market for information on costs the solution of the model with private 
information would yield the value of information.   47
different private estimates of such allocation. This will affect the opportunity cost of 
using current emission rights. 
 
In our model demand is not random and the random residual demand a firms faces is due 
to cost uncertainty. In a wholesale electricity market the demand intercept α  is  a 
continuous function of time (load-duration characteristic) that yields the variation of 
demand over the time horizon considered. At any time there is a fixed α and the market 
clears. Mansur and White (2009) show how a centralized auction market in the Eastern 
US yields very important information aggregation benefits over bilateral trading in order 
to achieve an efficient allocation in a situation where differences in marginal costs and 
production are private information among firms. In our model prices are revealing of 
average cost conditions but strategic behavior on the basis of private information prevents 
the achievement of an efficient allocation. We have seen also how increasing the noise in 
the private signal 
2
ε σ  makes the slope of supply steeper. This result may help explain the 
fact that in the Texas balancing market small firms use steeper supply functions than 
those predicted by theory and that those departures explain the major portion of losses in 
productive efficiency (Hortaçsu and Puller (2008)).36  Indeed, smaller firms may have 
signals of worse quality because of economies of scale in information gathering while 
residual non-contract private cost information has not been taken into account in the 
estimation. Consistently with our analysis the losses due to the “excess steepness” of 
supply functions over and above standard market power may be more important than the 
losses due to the latter. 
 
The Cournot framework has been used in a variety of studies.37 The advantage of the 
Cournot model is that it is a robust model in which capacity constraints and fringe 
suppliers are easily incorporated. A drawback is that the Cournot model tends to predict 
                                                 
36   The authors explain the finding by the complexity faced by small firms in set up the bidding. 
37   See, for example, Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) for the US; Alba et al. (1999) and Ramos et. al. 
(1998) for Spain; and Andersson and Bergman (1995) for Scandinavia.   48
prices that are too high given realistic estimates of the demand elasticity.38 The supply 
function approach is more realistic. Our model helps understand the biases introduced 
when taking the Cournot modeling short-cut when firms compete in supply functions. 
 
Pollution control  
The cost shock could be also related to some ex post pollution or emission damage which 
is assessed on the firm and for which the producer has some private information.  The 
unit tax would be given by θ   and the effective cost to the firm would include also an 
idiosyncratic component  ii θ= θ + η   , where  i cov , 0 ⎡⎤ η θ= ⎣⎦
  . In the pollution damage 
interpretation of the shock, and when the equilibrium calls for a downward sloping 
supply, we would have that when firms see the price going up they reduce supply because 
they figure out that the assessed pollution damage will be higher.  
 
Revenue management 
The cost shock can also be interpreted as a random opportunity cost of serving the market 
which is related to dynamic considerations (e.g. revenue management on the face of 
products with expiration date and costly capacity changes). Revenue management deals 
with situations where the product, be it a hotel room, airline flight, generated electricity 
or tickets for a concert, has an expiration date and capacity is fixed well in advance and 
can be added only at high marginal cost.39 The problem arises then of predicting the 
opportunity cost of sale (the value of a unit in a shortage situation). A high opportunity 
cost is an indication of high value of sales in the future. In this case a firm would have a 
private assessment of the opportunity cost with which it would form its supply schedule.  
 
Patterns of pricing for airline flights have proved difficult to explain with extant 
theoretical models (see e.g. McAfee and te Velde (2006)). If we believe that supply 
function competition provides a suitable reduced form for pricing in such markets then 
                                                 
38   However, including vertical relations and contracts in a Cournot setting provides better estimates (see 
Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2008)). 
39   Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) for the basics of revenue management.   49
taking into account the information aggregation role of price may help explaining some 
pricing patterns.40 We have seen that when the information role of the price dominates is 
index of scarcity role then supply is downward sloping. If this is the case the 
interpretation would be that when airlines see prices going up they may infer, correctly, 
that the opportunity cost is high (i.e. that expected next period demand is high) and they 
reduce supply in the present period to be able to supply next period at a higher profit. 
And, indeed, an airline when thinking about selling a seat in a flight today has to think 
about whether the same seat could be sold tomorrow at a higher price. In any case, when 
the variance of the (opportunity) cost shock increases the equilibrium reaction of firms is 
to set a flatter supply schedule inducing lower margins. Higher volatility of demand 
would translate then in lower margins.  
 
Strategic agency and trade policy 
Strategic agency models where an owner provides incentives to the manager to compete 
in the market place have typically a reduced form which is a supply function.41 This is 
similar to the presence of adjustment costs in certain industries committing the firms to 
supply functions (internal incentives in management consulting or the pricing program 
that airlines use).  
 
In strategic trade models a government can manipulate the supply function of domestic 
firms with tariffs and subsidies. Laussel (1992) considers a market with linear demand 
and constant marginal costs where firms compete in a common foreign market with the 
help of domestic tax-subsidy schemes. The domestic government imposes a quadratic 
export tax and a linear subsidy. The quadratic tax makes steeper the slope of the effective 
marginal cost schedule of a firm softening competition. The subsidy allows the domestic 
firm to capture a larger share of the profits. If marginal costs are random and private 
information to the firms or the amount of subsidy uncertain (with the domestic firm 
                                                 
40   See Section 10.1 in Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) for a description of airline pricing. For example, the 
authors state (p. 523): “A typical booking process proceeds as follows. An airline posts availability in 
each fare class to the reservation systems stating the availability of seats in each fare class.” This is 
indeed like a supply function.  
41   See Vickers (1985), Fersthman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Faulí-Oller  and Giralt (1995).   50
receiving a noisy signal about the cost/subsidy level) we can conclude from our model 
that introducing more noise in the signals also softens competition. In the case of 
subsidies this could be achieved with the disclosure policy of the government towards 
national firms (which are supposed to know more than foreign firms about the subsidies 
of their government). The opaqueness of subsidies may soften competition.42 
 
Reverse auctions 
In the initial Paulson plan of October 2008 reverse auctions were suggested as 
mechanisms to extract toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets.43 In a reverse auction the 
buyer, the US Treasury, would announce a buying schedule relating prices and quantities 
a certain class of securities (say Residential Mortgage Backed Securities out of California 
property of a certain face value, vintage and type).44  The buying schedule could be 
vertical (inelastic demand) or have some elasticity. Those securities are in the hands of 
multiple banks and the Treasury wants to buy a certain proportion of them. The value of 
the securities to bank i is  i θ , reflecting both the intrinsic value to the bank and the 
liquidity needs of the institution (both are correlated across institutions) and the bank has 
an imperfect estimate of  i θ   . The bank will sell first the securities with a lower 
probability of repayment of the underlying mortgages and will move on to better 
securities only if in need to sell more. This means that the marginal cost of selling 
securities will be increasing:  i x λ   for selling an amount  i x   of the securities.  The 
parameter λ reflects the quality heterogeneity of the securities, the larger it is the faster 
the securities of the bank improve as the lemons are sold. It is reasonable to think that in 
a crisis situation λ will be higher since the quality heterogeneity of the securities will 
increase. 
                                                 
42    Grant and Quiggin (1997) study the case in which firms are competitive and governments try to 
manipulate their supply functions. In their model the competitive supply functions of the firms also 
depend on a shock. Whenever supply functions are linear the authors find an equilibrium in tax-
subsidy schedules with quadratic trade revenue taxes. Again here the quadratic tax allows the 
government to manipulate the slope of the supply of the competitive domestic firms. 
43    Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. The Federal Reserve is also considering reverse 
auctions to mop out excess liquidity in a post-crisis scenario. 
44    Designs security-by-security and pooled auctions have been proposed with dynamic auctions (see  
Ausubel and Cramton (2008)) and for static auctions for substitute goods (Klemperer (2009)).   51
 
The Treasury is uninformed about the value of the securities and the reverse auction will 
serve a price discovery purpose eliciting the average value θ   . Banks which value the 
security the least or have the higher liquidity needs will sell more. Market power is 
definitely a potential concern in this type of auction given the potentially few bidders. 
This means that with high correlation competition will be softened and the Treasury will 
pay much more than the competitive price for the securities. It is worth noting that the 
Treasury has no incentive to release any public information it may have since this would 
only increase the distortion. Introducing an elastic demand function would alleviate the 
market power problem and reduce the distortion. This also avoids any potential market 
breakdown when demand is inelastic and the combination of the number of bidders and 
the degree of adverse selection makes the linear equilibrium collapse. 
 
6.2 Demand schedule competition 
The model can be restated in terms of competition among buyers of an asset of unknown 
ex-post average value ()
n
i i1 /n
= θ≡ θ ∑   . The value for agent i is ii θ= θ + η   , 
where i cov , 0 ⎡⎤ ηθ= ⎣⎦
  . With a change of variables  ii zx ≡ − we have the results for demand 
competition. The (inverse) supply of the asset is given by  i i pz =α+β∑  (with  0 β> ) 
where  i iz ∑   is the total quantity demanded. The equilibrium demand is 
() () () ii i Z s,p E s,p p / d =⎡ θ ⎤ − + λ ⎣⎦  = i b as cp − +− (with the endogenous parameters as in 
Proposition 1). The case of inelastic supply where an auctioneer supplies k units of the 
good is easily accommodated letting  β →∞ and / k 0 −αβ → > . The marginal benefit of 
buying  i z units of the asset for agent i is  ii z θ −λ , where  i θ  is the value with a private 
component and  i z λ  a transaction or opportunity cost, or risk aversion component.45 The 
profits of agent i are given by   ( )
2
ii ii pz z/ 2 π=θ− − λ . A real market example would be 
                                                 
45   Note that the adjustment cost is exogenous while with CARA preferences, for example, it would be 
endogenous and would depend, in expectation, on the degree of risk aversion times the variance of θ 
conditional on the information of the trader.   52
firms purchasing labor of unknown average productivity θ    because of technological 
uncertainty, and facing an inverse linear labor supply and quadratic adjustment costs in 
the labor stock.  
 
A first application of the model is to legacy loans auctions which were envisioned in the 
Public-Private Investment Program of March 2009 to remove those bad loans from the 
balance sheet of banks.46 Basically, the banks nominate pools of legacy loans that meet 
certain criteria and that they wish to sell. Approved private investors bid for the pools of 
loans and receive a non-recourse loan having as collateral the same securities to be 
acquired. The winning bid for each pool then is either accepted or rejected by the bank. 47 
In terms of our model the marginal valuation of a bidder will depend on the collateral that 
it can post. Using the same securities as collateral of the non-recourse loan to finance the 
purchase is equivalent to providing a subsidy to bidders that decreases the slope of their 
marginal valuation.  Our model would rationalize then the subsidy scheme of the 
Treasury since it would reduce the discount of the auction price. 
 
We turn now to applications to Treasury auctions or open market central bank operations 
(to provide liquidity to the banking system).   
 
Financial market auctions 
In an open market operation the supply of funds is given by the central bank (usually 
inelastically). The ECB conducts typically weekly repo auctions (main refinancing 
operations) and the Federal Reserve holds daily ones (presently both have a 
discriminatory format). The US Treasury auctions are uniform price format exclusively 
since 1998. 
Each bank bids for funds with a demand function. Ewerhart et al. (2009) argue that the 
marginal valuations of bidders in the open market operations should be declining. For 
                                                 
46   See www.financialstability.gov.  
47    Ausubel and Cramton (2009) propose to combine the forward auction with a reverse auction as in the 
Paulson plan.   53
example, θ    is related to the interest rate/price in the secondary interbank market and  λ 
reflects the structure of counterparty i´s pool of collateral. A bank (bidder) prefers to 
provide the central bank illiquid collateral in exchange for funds. However, with an 
increased allotment the bidder must forward more liquid types of collateral which have a 
higher opportunity cost and this explains the declining marginal valuation. The marginal 
value  i θ  for funds of bank i is idiosyncratic and is only assessed imperfectly by the own 
bank (for example, due to uncertainty about future liquidity needs). Those values are 
correlated among banks. 
Our results imply the following predictions for the case of an inelastic supply k: (i) there 
is a discount with respect to the expectation of the secondary market or average value 
Es ⎡⎤ θ ⎣⎦
     since  () pE s d k / n ⎡⎤ =θ− + λ ⎣⎦
    ; (ii) as fundamentals’ volatility 
2
θ σ  increases the 
discount decreases;  (iii)  when the liquidity of collateral high  (low λ) bids schedules are 
very flat; (iv) increasing the size of the auction (k) or providing more public information 
(higher  
2 1 θ σ / ) leads to an increased discount. All these are documented features of the 
ECB euro auctions (Ewerhart et al. (2009)).48 
Our model also illustrates the impact of a crisis situation. The more severe the 
information problem (a larger ρor 
22 / ε θ σ σ ) or the more costly to part with more liquid 
collateral (higher λ )49, the steeper demand functions are, the larger the equilibrium 
margin and the amount of bid shading, and the inefficiency in funds allocation (in the 
extreme the linear equilibrium may break down due to severe adverse selection coupled 
with market power).50 Note that when a bank sees a high price for funds it infers that the 
values of other banks are high and therefore its own value also high.  Cassola et al. 
(2009) study ECB auctions and show that after the subprime crisis in August 2007 
                                                 
48    Note however that the ECB auctions in the period studied are discriminatory while our model is 
uniform price.  
49    Note also that if we interpret λ as proxy for risk aversion then in a crisis situation it is usually thought        
that risk aversion increases. 
50   Flannery (1996) builds an adverse selection model of the secondary market for bank assets where there 
is a fire-sale penalty which, it is argued, should be higher in a crisis situation because of increased 
uncertainty about the signals received by institutions.   54
marginal valuations for funds of banks increased and the aggregate bid curve was steeper 
with increased bid shading. These authors also find evidence of strategic effects. In our 
model the level effect on valuations would be represented by an increase inθ.  
What has been the response of central banks to the crisis? The central bank has two main 
objectives in the liquidity auctions. The first is to inject the right amount of money so that 
the short term rate stays close to the target level. The second is to provide appropriate 
liquidity to the banks (enough in particular to cover their reserve requirements). A fixed-
quantity auction controls the aggregate amount of money injected exactly and elicits the 
values for liquidity of the banks (price discovery). However, there is an inefficiency in 
the distribution of liquidity which can be substantial when 
22 and/or / εθ ρ σσ  are large. A 
first way to reduce the inefficiency in the allocation is accepting lower quality collateral 
from the banks in the repo auctions. This is equivalent to provide a quadratic subsidy to 
the banks that lowers effectivelyλ. The amount of the subsidy will be increasing with 
22  and  / εθ ρσ σ  and decreasing with n. Central banks have enlarged acceptable collateral 
and some the qualifying participants in the auctions. For example, the Federal Reserve 
established the TAF auction facility (with a single-price format) to broaden the range of 
counterparties and the range of collateral in relation to regular open market operations.  
A second way is to modify the auction procedure. The inelastic supply auction may 
generate a lot of inefficiency when 
22 and/or / ε θ ρ σσ , as well as λ, are large.  It may pay 
then to introduce some elasticity in the supply to control market power and reduce 
inefficiency. In the extreme the central bank could set a fixed-price tender (an horizontal 
supply schedule with  0 β= ). The trade-offs are the following. The inelastic auction 
provides price discovery and tight quantity control but the allocation may be very 
distortionary. The fixed-price tender controls the amount of money injected only 
indirectly, and does not elicit the liquidity value from the banks, but eliminates any 
inefficiency in the distribution of liquidity since banks bid competitively. This may be 
precisely the case in a crisis situation where a fixed-price full-allotment tender may be 
preferable. A fixed-price tender controls the amount of money injected only indirectly, 
and does not elicit the liquidity value from the banks, but eliminates any inefficiency in   55
the distribution of liquidity since banks bid competitively. Noting that in a crisis situation 
the control of the total amount of liquidity comes second to making enough liquidity 
available to the banks helps to explain what the ECB has done after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers by accepting the banks’ demands in full at a fixed rate instead of the 
usual auction where banks would bid for money and set the interest rate in the process.  
It is worth noting that the central bank should have no incentive to release public 
information (i.e. increase 
2 1/ θ σ ) since this would increase bid shading and the distortion 
in the allocation of liquidity. 
In the Treasury auction interpretation the sources of private information could be 
different expectations about the future resale value of securities θ    (for instance, bidders 
have different forecast of inflation and securities are denominated in nominal terms), and 
as before bidders may have different liquidity needs due to idiosyncratic shocks. There is 
evidence of private information in Treasury auctions, which prices feature a discount 
from secondary market prices, increasing with the noise in the signal of the bidders, as 
well as of auctions prices aggregating information (Cammack (1991), Nyborg et al. 
(2002)).51  Bindseil et al. (2005) argue that the common value component in T-bill 
auctions is much more important than in the case of central bank auctions. US Treasury 
auctions are exclusively uniform price since October 1998, and only a limited number of 
primary dealers can submit competitive bids.52  Gordy (1999) argues that bidders in 
Treasury auctions submit demand schedules to protect against the winner’s curse and he 
associates larger bid dispersion with increased incidence of the winner’s curse in 
Treasury auctions in Portugal. Bid dispersion in our model can be associated with the 
slope of the demand schedule with a steeper slope when the information problem is more 
severe. 
                                                 
51    Hortaçsu and Kastl (2008) cannot reject the hypothesis that bidders in Canadian 3-months T-Bill 
auctions have private values. 
52   Similarly in Treasury auctions in Sweden the range of participants is from 6 to 15 (Nyborg et al. 
(2002)).   56
Underpricing is thought to be a serious problem in uniform price auctions.53 Keloharju et 
al. (2005) find underpricing but little support for market power effects in uniform price 
Finnish Treasury auctions and they attribute it to the fact that the Treasury acts 
strategically manipulating supply after observing the bids. There are also worries that in 
the present financial crisis margins and profits of (Wall Street) dealers have grown 
dramatically at the expense of the Treasury and the Fed (part of the story may come from 
a decrease in the number of participants in the auctions).54 The Treasury could profit also 
from using an elastic supply schedule in its auctions. Supposedly its objective may be 
revenue minus an adjustment cost of a quantity target. If this is the case our results would 
indicate that the optimal schedule should be more elastic the more severe the adverse 
selection problem is. A lower β   would reduce underbidding but would increase the 
departures from the quantity target and underbidding increases when adverse selection 
worsens.55 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In a model with private and common value uncertainty and no exogenous noise we have 
found a privately revealing equilibrium where the incentives to acquire information are 
preserved. Several testable implications derive from the equilibrium. Price-cost margins 
and bid shading are increasing in cost correlation and in the noise in the signals, and 
decreasing with the size of the market. Note, however, that information on the slope of 
marginal costs/benefits will be needed to disentangle the effect of this parameter from the 
distortion introduced by private information. Price volatility is increasing with noise in 
the signals and prior volatility. The results may help explain pricing patterns arising in 
electricity markets, revenue management and auctions. For example, it explains how the 
Treasury may overpay in reverse auctions for toxic assets. It may also explain how in a 
financial crisis loosening collateral requirements in central bank liquidity auctions may 
be part of an optimal subsidy scheme to banks and how a central bank may respond 
                                                 
53   Kandel et al. (1999) provide underpricing evidence for IPO (initial public offering) uniform-price 
auctions in Israel. 
54   See Financial Times, August 3, 2009: “Wall St. profits from Fed role” and Wall St. gets its cut from 
the Fed and Treasury”. 
55   LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) advocate this in a model with no adverse selection to control market power.   57
optimally by changing the liquidity facility from an auction to a fixed rate tender. Finally, 
the model also characterizes the biases introduced by a Cournot model when competition 
is in fact in supply or demand schedules. 
   58
Appendix I: Proofs of Propositions 1, 4 and 6. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that sellers other than i use the 
strategy () ii Xs , p b a s c p =− + . Form the market clearing equation and from the point of 
view of seller i (provided a0 > ) the price is informationally equivalent to 
() () () () ji ii j hb n 1 1 n 1 c p x / a s ≠ ≡β − − α + + β − + β β= ∑   . The pair () i s,p  i s  
informationally equivalent to the pair ( ) ii s ,h , hence 
ii ii i Es , pEs , h ⎡θ⎤ = ⎡ θ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ . 
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⎡θ ⎤ = θ = θ+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ − σ+− ρ + σ ⎣⎦
σσ − ρ + −ρ + σ σσρ
+
σ − ρ+ σ σ + − ρ+ σ σ − ρ+ σ σ + − ρ+ σ
 
 
We are looking for strategies of the form ( ) ii Xs , p b a s c p = −+. Using the F.O.C. 
()
ii i pE s , p x
1n 1 c
⎛⎞ β
−⎡ θ ⎤ = + λ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎝⎠
 and the expression for  i h  we obtain the following  
 
() () () ()
() () () () ()
( )( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () ()
() ()
() () () () () () ()
22 2 22 2 2 2
i 22 2 2 22 2 2
22
i 22 2 2
11 n 1 1n b a
s
11 n 1 11 n 1
1n ca
1p b a s c p
1n 1 c 11 n 1
θε θ εε θ θ ε
ε θ εθ ε θ εθ
θε
εθ ε θ
−ρ σ σ + + − ρ σ σσ +− ρ σθ + σ σ ρ β − αβ
−−
σ+ − ρσ σ+ + − ρσ σ+ − ρσ σ+ + − ρσ
⎛⎞ σσρ + β β ⎛⎞ β ⎜⎟ +− = + λ − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − σ+ − ρσ σ+ + − ρσ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
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Identifying coefficients, letting










−ρσ ++ −ρ σ
, we obtain a,b,c by 















1n 1 c 1
Mn b
b
1n 1 c n 1n 1
M1 n c
1c






⎧ ⎛⎞ −ρ σ β
⎪ =+ λ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − σ+ − ρσ ⎪ ⎝⎠
⎪
⎪ ⎛⎞ β− α σ β ⎪−θ + λ − = ⎜⎟ ⎨ ⎜⎟ +β − β σ+ + − ρσ ⎝⎠ ⎪
⎪
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ +β ββ ⎪
−+ λ = + λ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎪ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ β+ β − + β − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎪ ⎩
 
 












































. The last equation in the curved bracket is quadratic in c of the 
form  () gc=0 with 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
2 MM
gc n 11 Mc 1 M n 1 c 1 .
nn
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ = λ β− + + β + λ+ +−λ− β + β + λ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ β ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 
For n = 1 there is a unique solution to the quadratic equation. Otherwise, it can be 
checked that the determinant of the quadratic equation is positive and therefore the 
equation has two real roots. Furthermore, only the largest root c is compatible with the 
second order condition. 
 
It is easily checked also that  ( ) () gM / 1 Mn 0 −+ β <  and therefore for the largest root we 
have  () cM / 1 M n >− + β  because of convexity of the parabola  ( ) g ⋅ . It follows also that    60
() cM / 1 M n1 / n >− + β >− β  and  therefore1n c 0 +β>. Since nc 1 β >−   it follows that 
() 1n 1 c 0 +β −>  either for c0 >  or c0 < .  Furthermore, a0 > . This is so since from the 




= +λ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − ⎝⎠
. To see that 




M1 n c 1
c
1n 1 c n
−
⎛⎞ +β β
=+ λ − < ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ +β − β λ ⎝⎠
. 
The largest root decreases with M  since g / M 0 ∂ ∂>  for c 1/ n >− β .  This is so since it 
can be checked that  g / M ∂∂  is a convex parabola in c with largest root  1/ n −β . It 
follows that for c 1/ n >− β  we have that g / M 0 ∂ ∂> . Similarly, we have that  g / 0 ∂∂ λ >  
at any candidate equilibrium c.  This is so since it can be checked that  g / ∂∂ λ  is a convex 
parabola in c with largest root  ( ) M/ 1 M n − +β for  n1 >   and we know that 
() () gM / 1 Mn 0 −+ β < . This means that since  ( ) g ⋅   is a convex parabola in c,  in 
equilibrium we have that  ( ) cM / 1 M n >− + β  and the result that  g / 0 ∂ ∂λ > follows. We 
conclude that the largest root decreases with λ. When M0 =  we have thatc0 > . In this 
case we have that c increases in n since  ( ) g/ n c c 1 0 ∂ ∂= β λ− < for 
1 c0
− λ >>. Finally, 
it is possible to check that 
() () ( )() ( ) ( ) () () ( ) ( )
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ()
1 11 1 1 1 1
1
c n 1 1 cn 1 Mn 1 n 1 1 Mn c Mn 2Mn c Mn 2M g/ n c
n g/ c 2 c n1M1 n1 M1 M n n1
− −− − − − −
−
β β+λ β − + β+ −ρ −ρ ρ − + + β−β+ λ+ βλ− βλ+ βλ ∂∂ ∂
∂ ∂∂ λβ − + + −β − + β+λ + + λ − =− =−
It follows that  
()
() () ( ) () () ( ) ( ) () () () ( ) ( )
() () ()
11 1 c n 1 1 Mn n 1 Mn 1 c M 1 n 1 1 Mn n 1 1
n1 1 g /c
c
nn c ( n1 ) ( n1 ) c 0
−− − β + λ β −+ − ρ − − ρ+ β + ρ −+ + − ρ −
ρ− + β ∂∂
∂∂
∂∂ −=− + = >  
when  c0 > since  g/ c 0 ∂∂ >,  () ( ) ( ) ()
1 cn 1 1 n n 0





−ρ ≤<  ,  both  () () () 1 n1 1M n n1 1 0 − ρ −+ + − ρ −>  and 
() () ()
11 Mn n 1 Mn 1 0 −− −ρ − − ρ ≥  follow. ♦ 
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Lemma.  If nM20 −− ≥  then as  0 λ → ,  ( ) c λ →∞. If nM20 − −<  then as  0 λ→ , 
() ( )( ) cn M / n M 2 n λ→ − − − − β (in this case  
0 limc 0











−ρ ρ − +
<  
or nM < ). 
Proof:  From the implicit expression determining c in the proof of Proposition 1  
 
() ( ) ( )
() () ( )()
() () ( )















β+λ +β − σ ρ
σ− ρ + + σ− ρ β
β+λ +β − σ ρ β






and operating we obtain 
() ( ) ( )
() () ( )()
()
() () ( )
















β+λ +β − σ ρ
σρ−++ σ − ρ β
β+λ +β − σ ρ β










λ→ λ=ν.  Then, taking limits in the previous equality we obtain 
() ( )
() () ( )()
() ()
















+ν − σ ρ
σρ−++ σ − ρ
+ν − σ ρ β








Solving for ν,  we have  0   ν= and 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () ()
22
22
n21 n11 2n1 n2
.
n1 1 n1 1
θε
θε
σ− − ρ ρ − + − σ ρ − − +
ν=
−σ− ρ + σρ− +
 
 
Denote by  
0 cl i m c
λ→ =
 
.  In case that  0 ν = ,  using the implicit expression determining c we 
get that 
() () () ( )





2n 1 1 1 nM 1
c .
nn M 2 n nn 2 1 n 1 1 2 n 1 n 2
θε
θε
σ− ρ + + σ − ρ −
=− − =−
β− − β β σ − −ρ − ρ+ −σ ρ − − +
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() ( ) () ( ) () ( ) ()
22 n21 n1 1 2n1 n2 0 . θε σ− − ρ − ρ + − σ ρ − − +<  
 
If () ( ) () () ( ) ( )
22 n21 n11 2n1 n2 0 θε σ− − ρ ρ − + − σ ρ − − + > , then necessarily    0 ν>  and 
therefore  c =+ ∞
 
 (and  ( ) ( ) 1c n1 0 + − β >   ). When 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 n21 n 1 2n1 n2 0 , θε σ− − ρρ −ρ+− σ ρ −−+ <  the  condition  () () 1c n1 0 +− β >     
does not hold for  0 ν> . Finally, when
() ( )
() ( ) ( )
2




σρ − − +
− −ρ ρ−ρ+ σ=  direct computation of c yields 
a quadratic equation which larger solution tends to c = +∞
 
 as λ  converges to zero. Note 
that  
() () () () ( ) () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )()
22 2 2 n21 n1 1 2n1 n2 1 1 n1 nM2 .
θε ε θ σ − −ρ − ρ+ −σ ρ − − + = −ρ σ + + − ρ σ − −  
In summary: If () ( ) 1n M 2 0 −ρ− − ≥ , then 
0 limc .
λ→ = +∞  If  ( )( ) 1n M 2 0 −ρ− − < , then 
() ( )
0 limc n M / n M 2 n
λ→ =− − − − β .  (In this case,  
0 limc 0












−ρ ρ − +
<  or n M < ).♦ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 1 it can be checked that 
the coefficients of the equilibrium strategy  ( )
cc c c
ii Xs , p b a s c p =− + are given by the 

























σ+ − ρσ ⎪
⎪
β− α σ ⎪−θ − λ = λ ⎨
β σ+ + − ρσ ⎪
⎪
+β ⎛⎞ ⎪ −λ = λ ⎜⎟ ⎪ β ⎝⎠ ⎩
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where 










−ρ σ + + − ρ σ
 The equilibrium coefficients are given by: 
 
()





























σ+ + − ρσ  
 
It is immediate that
c 1/ c 1/ n λ> >− β , a0 > , 
c c  is strictly decreasing inM , and 
c c0 >  
for M0 = . ♦ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: Recall that the n subscript denotes the n-replica market. Note first 
that from the equation  () n fc 0 =  in the n-replica market defining  n c  (just replace β by 
























(and  n n MM ∞ ⎯⎯ → ), and 
1
n n c
− ⎯⎯ →λ   if  0 ρ = . It is immediate then that 
the order of the distortion  () ( )
1 1
nn dn n 1 c
− − =β + −   is 1/n  and  the same holds for   
() () ()
1 c1
nn n n cc d / M1
− − −= + λ− λ + and  () ( ) ()
1 c1
nn n aa d / M 10
− − − =λ − + λ + > . (Note 
also that we have  () ( )
1 1
nn n n cd c M
− − =λ + −β + ).   
 
Let us show first the order for the price difference  ()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.  We know that 
()
cc
nn nn pp xx −= β −     and that () () ( ) ( ) ()
2 2 2 11 c
nn n n Ex x d E t
−− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ − = β+λ − β+λ+ α− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
     , 
where  () nn n n n n tE s s1 ⎡⎤ =θ = ξ+ − ξ θ ⎣⎦
        and  ( )
2
nn n var / var / n ε ξ≡ ⎡ θ⎤ ⎡ θ⎤ + σ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
   , 
() ()
2
n var 1 n 1 /n θ ⎡⎤ θ=+−ρ σ ⎣⎦
  . It follows that  n ∞ θ →θ      in mean square as n tends to 
infinity where  ∞ θ    is normally distributed with mean θ and variance
2
θ ρσ . In consequence,    64
() () ni ni ii ss n n == θ + ε ∑∑       will converge also in mean square to   ∞ θ    (since  
() i n i n0 ε⎯ ⎯ → ∑  in mean square).      Since 
n
n 1 ξ ⎯⎯ →  it follows that  n n t ∞ ⎯⎯ →θ      in 




   and  ()
2
n Et ⎡ ⎤ α−
⎣ ⎦
   are of the order of a constant. 
The order of   ()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 and  of  ( )
2 c
nn Ex x ⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
   is the order of 
() ( ) ()
2 11
n d
−− β+λ − β+λ+  which is 
2 1/n  since  () ( )
1 1
nn dn n 1 c
− − =β + −  is of the order 
of 1/n. 
 
We know also that  () () ( ) ()
2 2 2 1 c1
in in n i n Eu u d Et t
− − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= λ − λ + − ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
    where 
ii tE s ≡⎡ θ⎤ ⎣⎦ = ii j ji Es , s
≠
⎡⎤ θ
⎣⎦ ∑ . From the expression for  ii j ji Es , s
≠
⎡ ⎤ θ
⎣ ⎦ ∑ , and the fact 
that  n n MM ∞ ⎯⎯ →  and  n n s ∞ ⎯⎯ →θ       in mean square, it follows that 
() ()
11
ii i i tEs , 1 Ms M 1 M
−−
∞∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ⎡⎤ →θθ= + + + θ ⎣⎦
   in mean square as n tends to infinity, 
and  ()
2
in Et t ⎡⎤ −
⎣⎦
   is of the order of a constant. It follows that   ( )
2 c
in in Eu u ⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 is of order 
2 1/n  since  () ()
2 1 1
n d
− − λ− λ + is. We conclude that  
() () () ( ) ()
22 cc c
nn i ni n E TS E TS /n E x x E u u /2 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= β + λ − + λ − ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 is of order 
2 1/n .♦ 
 
 
Appendix II: Information acquisition  
In this Appendix we characterize the equilibrium with costly information acquisition. 
Consider the model of Section 2 and suppose now that private signals have to be 
purchased at a cost, increasing and convex in the precision  ε τ of the signal, according to a 
smooth function  ( ) H ⋅  that satisfies H(0) = 0, H' 0 >  for  0 ε τ > , and H'' 0 ≥ .  There are, 
thus, nonincreasing returns to information acquisition. A strategy for seller i is a pair 
(
i ε τ ,  () i X .,. ) determining the precision purchased and the supply function strategy.  We   65









be a pure equilibrium of the game, ( ) i i 1,...n X(,)
= ⋅⋅ needs to be the equilibrium of a game for 
a given precision tuple   ( ) () 2
i
1
i1 , . . . n
ε σ
=
. Since we are interested in studying a symmetric 
equilibrium, we assume that any seller  j i ≠   has the same precision, denoted by 2
1
ε σ , and 
the same coefficients, denoted by (b,a,c), for the candidate equilibrium supply function 
jj X(s ,p) b as cp, j i =− + ≠  . Provided that  ( ) 1n 1 c 0 +β− >  and exactly as in Section 2 
we obtain a supply function for seller i  
() ( ) () ii i i Xs , p pE s , p / d = −⎡ θ ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦  
with  () ()
1 1 dn 1 c
− − =β + − . Now, as in the proof of Proposition 1 from the point of view 
of seller i and provided a0 >  the price is informationally equivalent to  
() () () () ji ii j hb n 1 1 n 1 c p x / a s ≠ ≡β − − α + + β − + β β= ∑  , and applying standard Gaussian 
theory we obtain  
() () () () () ()




iii i i E( |s ,h ) (s ) h n 1
θθ θ ε θ θε σ σ + − ρσ +σ − − ρσ ρσ σ
∆∆ θ= θ + − θ + − − θ  
 
Where  () () () ( )
2
i
22 2 4 2
i 1( n2 ) n1 θε θε θ ∆≡σ+ σ + − ρσ+ σ − − σ ρ . 
 
Using the expression for the demand function of i and  i h and identifying coefficients with 
ii i i i i X( s,p ) b as cp =− +  we obtain 
() ( ) () () ( ) ()






(n 1)b (n 2) (n 1) 1 1( n 1 ) c
a a
ii i
1 (n 1)c a 1 (n 1)c a 1 (n 1)c a
1
a , b , and c .
α
θε θθ θ ε θ θ εε θε β
θε θε θε
ρσ σ − − σ σ + − ρσ +σ − − ρσ −ρ σ +σ σ θ ρσ σ +β −
∆β ∆∆ ∆
ρσ σ ρσ σ ρσ σ ββ β




        
The expected profits of seller i from trading are given by 
[] () ()
2
ii i EE X ( s , p )
1c n1 2
⎛⎞ βλ ⎡ ⎤ π= + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣ ⎦ +β − ⎝⎠
 .   66
After some lengthy manipulations it can be checked that   [ ] i E π = 
() () ( ) () () ( ) ()() () ( ) () () ( ) () ( )
() () ( ) () ( ) () () ()
2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 n1 1 a n1 1c n1 a n1 1 n1 1 n1 1c n1 a n2 1
i
42 2 2 2 2 1n 1 1 n 2 1
i
bc a
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
σσ − ρρ− ++ σ σ β ρ− − + β− +β − σ − ρρ− ++ σ + σ − σ ρ + β−− β σρ−+ + σ εε ε ε θθ θ θ θ θ
σ− ρ ρ − + + σ σ + σσ ρ − + + σ εε ε θθ θ
+α − θ − + θ− β ( ) ( )
() () () () ( )
2
n1
21 c n 1 2 1 c n 1 .
−
+β − β + λ +β −
 
The marginal benefit of acquiring precision 
ii
2 1/ ε ε τ ≡σ ,  [ ]
i i E/ ε ∂ π∂ τ , evaluated at a 
symmetric solution 
i εε τ= τ is given by  
()
() () ( )
() () ( )
() ( ) () ()
2
2 1 2
(1 ) 1 n 1 1




τ− ρ+ ρ−+ τ
ψτ ≡
β+ −β + λτ −ρ +τ τ +ρ − +τ
 
 
(note that it is decreasing in  ε τ   for a given c).  Interior symmetric equilibria are 
characterized by the solution of   ( ) ( ) H' 0 εε ψ τ− τ= with  ( ) c ε τ   given by the largest 
solution to the quadratic equation g(c) = 0 for a given ε τ .56 Let  ( ) ( ) 0 c0 l i m c
ε τ→ ε +≡ τ . 
This is well defined and is a function of  , ,   and  n β λρ since as 0 ε τ →   we have that 
() Mn / 1 →ρ −ρ . Then  () ( )
() ( ) () ( )
0 1 2
1
0l i m 0
22 1 n 1 c0
ε τ→ ε −
θ
ψ≡ ψ τ = >
β+ −β + + λ τ
, 
and  () 0 ε ψ τ→ as  ε τ→ ∞ . 
 
If  () () H' 0 0 <ψ  for  1 ρ<  there is an interior solution 
* 0
ε τ >  to the equation  
( ) ( ) ( ) H' 0 εε ε φτ ≡ ψτ − τ =  
since  () 00 φ >  ,  ( ) 0 φ ∞<  and  ( ) φ ⋅   is continuous. With considerable work, one can 
show that the solution is unique at least if n = 2 or if ρis close to 0 or 1.  
 
If  () () H' 0 0 ≥ψ   then there can not be any information acquisition in a symmetric 
equilibrium and in fact there is no equilibrium (with  ( ) H' 0  not too high). We have that 
                                                 
56   It can be checked that  [ ] i E π is strictly concave in 
i ε τ .   67
* 0 ε τ=  at a candidate equilibrium but this can not be an overall equilibrium since if other 
sellers do not purchase information then the price contains no additional information for a  
seller and it will pay a single seller to get information (with  ( ) H' 0  not too high). As 
parameters  , ,  and n βλρ move in such a way that  ( ) ( ) 0H ' 0 ψ↓ , then
* 0
ε τ→  and  the 
linear supply function equilibrium collapses. 
In summary: 
Proposition A.1. Let  ()








β +− β + + λ τ
. There is a symmetric 
equilibrium in the game with costly information acquisition provided that  () ( ) H' 0 0 <ψ  
and 1 ρ< . At equilibrium sellers buy a positive precision of information 
* 0
ε τ> . This is 
so in particular if  () H' 0 0 =  or the prior is diffuse enough ( θ τ  small) (even if the number 








since  () c0 1 / n +→ − β.  
 
In the replica economy (Section  6) we have to replace β  by  / n β  and we have that 
()









β+− β + + λ τ
. Proposition A.1 applies with  ( ) n 0 ψ  








() n c0 1 / +→ − β. For ρ  close to 1 for any number of sellers we will need the same 
degree of diffusion of the prior in order to have positive precision acquisition.  
 
 
Appendix III: Cournot competition 
 
Consider the market exactly as in Section 2 in the replica version (section 4) but now 
seller i sets a quantity contingent on its information { } i s .57 The seller has no other source 
                                                 
57   See Vives (2002) for related results when cost parameters are i.i.d. and Vives (1988) for the common 
value case.   68
of information and, in particular, does not condition on the price. The expected profits of 
seller i conditional on receiving signal si and assuming seller j, j ≠ i, uses strategy  jj X( s) ,  
are 
( ) ( )
2




⎡π ⎤ = − ⎡θ ⎤ − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑ . 
 
From the F.O.C. of the optimization of a seller we obtain 
() ii i i pE s x x
n
β
−⎡ θ⎤ + λ= ⎣⎦ . 
(Note that given that the profit function is strictly concave and the information structure 













nn i i i i i n i1 i1
11
EM C E s x E s x
nn
== ≡ ⎡ θ⎤ + λ= ⎡ θ⎤ + λ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑∑   and  () nn p/ x η= β   . The 
margins are larger or smaller than in the supply function equilibrium case depending on 
whether the slope of supply  n c  is positive or negative since in the Cournot case they 
correspond to the case of n c0 = .  
 
The following proposition characterizes the Bayesian Cournot equilibrium and the price-
taking Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (denoted by a superscript c). Both equilibria are 
different from their supply function counterparts (except in the knife-edge case for which 
n c0 = ) since there is no conditioning in the market price. We will abuse somewhat 
notation and we will use the same notation for parameters at the Cournot equilibrium than 
at the supply function one. 
 
Proposition A.4. There is a unique equilibrium and a unique price-taking Bayesian 
Cournot equilibrium. They are symmetric, and affine in the signals. Letting 
22 2 /( ) θθ ε ξ≡σ σ +σ  the strategies of the sellers are given (respectively) by:   69
 



































Proof: Drop the subscript n labeling the replica market and let  1 β = . We consider first the 
Bayesian Cournot equilibrium. We check that the candidate strategies form an 
equilibrium. The expected profits of seller i conditional on receiving signal si and 
assuming seller j, j ≠ i, uses strategy ( ) j X ⋅ , are 
   () ii i j j i ii i ji
11
Esx Es E X s s x
nn 2
≠
⎛⎞ λ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ π= α − θ− − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ∑ . 
Then first order conditions (F.O.C.) yield for i = 1,..., n: 
() () ij j i i ii ji
11
Es E X s s2 X s .
nn 2
≠
λ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ α− θ − = + ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∑
 
Plugging in the candidate equilibrium strategy and using the formulae for the conditional 
expectations for  ii Es ⎡⎤ θ ⎣⎦ and ji Ess ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , 
 
() ii i Es s1 ⎡⎤ θ= ξ + − ξ θ ⎣⎦  and  ( ) ji ji i Ess E s s 1 ⎡⎤⎡⎤ = θ = ξρ + −ξρ θ ⎣⎦⎣⎦ , 
it is easily checked that they satisfy the F.O.C. (which are also sufficient in our model). 
To prove uniqueness we show that the Bayesian Cournot equilibria of our game are in 
one-to-one correspondence with the (person-by-person) optimization of an appropriately 
defined concave quadratic team function G. A team decision rule  () () ( ) 11 n n X s ,...,X s  is 
(person-by-person) optimal if it can not be improved upon by changing only one   70
component  () i X ⋅ (i.e. each agent maximizes the team objective conditional on his 
information and taking as given the strategies of the other agents.) Let 
() () ( ) ii i Gx x f x − =π +  where 
() ()
2
kj ii j j j k j ji ji k,j i
11
fx x x x x
n2 2 n
≠ − ≠≠ ≠
λ ⎛⎞ α−θ − + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
=∑∑ ∑ . 
This yields  
() ()
2
jj j i j jj i j
11
Gx x x x x
n2 2 n
≠
λ ⎛⎞ =α − θ − + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑ . 
We obtain the same outcome by solving either 
i xi i max E s ⎡ ⎤ π ⎣ ⎦  or 
i xi max E G s ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  since 
() ii fx −  does not involve  i x . Note now that person-by-person optimization is equivalent 
in our context to the global optimization of the team function (since the random term 
does not affect the coefficients of the quadratic terms and the team function is concave in 
actions, Radner (1962, Theorem 4)). Invoke the result by Radner (1962, Theorem 5)), 
which implies that in our model, the components of the unique Bayesian team decision 
function of the equivalent team problem are affine. Based on the above three observations 
conclude that the affine Bayesian Cournot equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. 
A similar argument establishes the result for the Bayesian price-taking equilibrium. Then 
the F.O.C. for seller i is given by    
() () ij j i i ii j
1
Es E X s s X s ,
n
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ α− θ − =λ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑
 
and the solution is a (person-by-person) maximum of a team problem with an objective 
function which is precisely the ETS.  ♦ 
 
We consider, as before, convergence to price taking and its speed as the economy is 
replicated.  The following proposition characterizes the convergence of the Bayesian   71
Cournot equilibrium to a price-taking equilibrium. ETS (
c
n ETS ) denotes here the 
expected total surplus at the (price-taking) Bayesian Cournot equilibrium. 
 
Proposition A.5. As the market grows large the market price  n p  at the Bayesian Cournot 
equilibrium converges in mean square to the price-taking Bayesian Cournot price 
c
n p  at 
the rate of 1/n. (That is,  ()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 tends to 0 at the rate of 
2 1/n .) The difference 
()
c
nn ETS ETS /n −  is of the order of 
2 1/n .  
 
Proof: Let us show first the order for the price difference  ()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.  We know that 
()
cc
nn nn pp xx −= β −     and,  letting  ii i rE s ⎡ ⎤ ≡θ ⎣ ⎦ and  ( )
n
ni i1 rr / n
= = ∑     it is easily checked 
that 
() () ( ) () ()
2 2 11 2 c
nn n Ex x / n E r
−− ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= β + λ − β + λ + β α − ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
     , 
where  () nn rs 1 =ξ + −ξ θ     and 
22 2 /( ) θ θε ξ ≡σ σ +σ . From this it follows that 
() n r1 →ξ θ+ −ξ θ     in mean square and therefore  ()
2
n Er ⎡ ⎤ α− ⎣ ⎦
    is of the order of a 
constant. The order of   ()
2 c
nn Ep p ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 and  of  ( )
2 c
nn Ex x ⎡ ⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
   is the order of 
() ( ) ()
2 11 /n
−− β+λ − β+λ+β  which is 
2 1/n . 
 
It is easily checked also that  () () ( ) ()
2 2 12 c1
in in i n Eu u / n Err
− − ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −= λ − λ + β − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
  . The 
order of  ()
2
in Err ⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦
    will be the same as  ()
2 2
in Es s ⎡ ⎤ ξ− ⎣ ⎦
  which is the order of a 
constant. Since the order of  () ()
2 1 1 /n
− − λ− λ + β is 
2 1/n , it follows that the order of     72
()
2 c
in in Eu u ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 is  also 
2 1/n . We conclude that   
() () () ( ) ()
22 cc c
nn i ni n E TS E TS /n E x x E u u /2 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= β + λ − + λ − ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 is of order 
2 1/n . ♦ 
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